California Guard Card Terrorism Awareness & WMD Practice Questions

1. Under the federal definition (18 U.S.C. §2331), terrorism centrally involves:

18 U.S.C. §2331 defines both international and domestic terrorism. The common elements: violent acts (or acts dangerous to human life) that violate criminal law, AND the actor's intent — to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence government policy by intimidation or coercion, or affect government conduct by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. Personal motive without political/ideological coercion goal (a) is ordinary violent crime. Citizenship is not the dividing line (c) — both domestic and international terrorism exist. There is no casualty threshold (d).

2. 'Domestic terrorism' as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2331(5) is distinguished from 'international terrorism' chiefly by:

Domestic terrorism under §2331(5) involves activities that occur primarily within US territorial jurisdiction and are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence government, or affect conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. The dividing line from international terrorism (§2331(1)) is geographic/jurisdictional, not severity (a), weapon type (b), or which agency leads (d — investigation may involve FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces regardless). Recent threat assessments identify domestic violent extremism — including racially-motivated, anti-government, and other ideologies — as significant US threats.

3. 'Lone-wolf' or homegrown violent extremism is characterized by:

FBI / DHS threat assessments highlight that lone offenders — often radicalized through online content with minimal physical contact with formal organizations — are exceptionally difficult to detect through conspiracy-based intelligence because there is no conspiracy to penetrate. Early warning typically comes from observable pre-attack behaviors (leakage to family, online posts, surveillance, weapon acquisition) that security officers and the public may notice. This drives the importance of suspicious-activity reporting and the 'See Something, Say Something' campaign. (b), (c), and (d) describe other threat categories.

4. Which of the following is NOT generally listed as a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) behavioral indicator under the Nationwide SAR Initiative?

Nationwide SAR Initiative indicators include surveillance, photography of restricted/critical infrastructure with no apparent purpose, eliciting information, testing/probing of security, breach/attempted intrusion, misrepresentation, theft/diversion of materials, acquisition of expertise or supplies, weapons discovery, sector-specific incidents, and expressed/implied threats. Routine employee activity during business hours (d) is normal and not a SAR indicator — SARs require articulable behavioral concerns, not status or appearance. 28 CFR Part 23 governs intelligence-system criminal information standards to prevent unconstitutional reporting.

5. DHS's public awareness campaign for reporting suspicious activity, often referenced in BSIS terrorism-awareness modules, is:

'If You See Something, Say Something' is the registered DHS campaign emphasizing that observation of behavior (not appearance, race, ethnicity, or religion) is what matters, and that the public — including security officers — are critical reporting partners. The campaign directs reports to local law enforcement or 911 for emergencies, the FBI for federal jurisdiction (especially terrorism), and tip lines such as 1-855-TELL-FBI. Officers are trained to report observable behavior, not based on identity characteristics — which would violate civil-rights protections (28 CFR Part 23, federal civil-rights statutes).

6. For an observed pattern suggesting terrorism preparation that is not an immediate emergency, the most appropriate reporting channel from the BSIS curriculum is:

Standard reporting flow: local law enforcement is the universal first channel (911 for emergencies, non-emergency line otherwise). For terrorism-related observations, the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force coordinates federal/state/local response; state Fusion Centers (in California, the State Threat Assessment Center and regional centers including JRIC) provide analysis and information sharing. Internal incident reporting to the employer parallels law-enforcement reporting. Social-media posting (a) compromises investigations and may defame; ignoring (b) abandons the SAR duty; confrontation (d) endangers the officer and tips off the suspect.

7. The 'CBRNE' acronym used in WMD-awareness training stands for:

CBRNE — Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive — is the FEMA / CISA / DOD framework for categorizing weapons of mass destruction and weapons capable of mass casualties. Chemical agents (nerve, blister, blood, choking) cause harm through toxicity; Biological agents (pathogens, toxins) cause harm through disease; Radiological agents disperse radioactive material (dirty bombs); Nuclear involves fission/fusion devices; Explosive includes IEDs and conventional explosives. Different agent categories require different protective and response measures, which is why the framework drives training and equipment planning.

8. Which set of observations would most strongly suggest a possible chemical attack rather than a routine incident?

Chemical-attack indicators taught in CDC and DHS modules include sudden clustered casualties with similar symptoms, unusual odors (almonds may suggest cyanide, garlic may suggest mustard agent, freshly cut grass may suggest phosgene — although many agents are odorless), dead vegetation or animals in proximity, and witnesses reporting eye/skin/respiratory irritation. Single illness (a) is generally not a chemical attack signal; routine deliveries (c) and normal HVAC (d) do not suggest attack. Response: move upwind/uphill, deny entry, call 911 specifying possible chemical incident.