California Guard Card Appropriate Use of Force Practice Questions

1. The U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386 established that the constitutional reasonableness of force is judged from:

Graham v. Connor adopted the objective-reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment seizure-by-force claims: courts judge force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, without 20/20 hindsight, considering all the facts and circumstances, including the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to flee. Subjective intent (a) is not the test; suspect perception (c) is not the standard; outcome-based liability (d) was rejected. Although Graham concerns peace officers, its reasonableness framework informs private-security civil standards.

2. Penal Code §835a, as amended by AB 392 (2019), declares that the authority to use physical force is a 'serious responsibility' to be exercised:

Penal Code §835a(a)(1) reflects the legislative findings of AB 392, declaring that 'the authority to use physical force, conferred on peace officers by this section, is a serious responsibility that shall be exercised judiciously and with the highest regard for the dignity and sanctity of every human life.' Subsequent provisions emphasize de-escalation, alternatives to force, and limit deadly force to imminent threats. Although §835a directly governs peace officers, its principles inform reasonableness expectations for private security in civil-liability analysis.

3. Under Penal Code §835a(c)(1), as amended by AB 392, deadly force by a peace officer is justified only when necessary in defense of human life — specifically when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that deadly force is necessary to:

AB 392 narrowed §835a(c)(1) to require an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury (SBI) — closely paralleling the standard the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1 for fleeing felons (limited to those who threaten death or SBI). Mere flight (a), property protection (c), and property-owner instructions (d) do not authorize deadly force. Private guards have no broader authority than peace officers in this regard and should treat deadly force as available only in defense of life.

4. Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1 held that deadly force against a fleeing felon is constitutionally permissible only when:

Garner rejected the common-law 'any fleeing felon' rule and held the Fourth Amendment forbids deadly force against a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Mere flight (a), bare possession of a weapon (b), and refusal to stop (c) are insufficient by themselves. Garner's principle is codified for California peace officers in PC §835a(c)(1) and informs the universal standard private security must respect.

5. Penal Code §835a(a)(2) (consistent with SB 230's training mandate) requires officers to:

Penal Code §835a(a)(2) embodies California's de-escalation policy: officers should use de-escalation techniques, crisis intervention tactics, and other alternatives to force, when feasible. SB 230 reinforces this with state-mandated training. The principle directly informs BSIS curricula and guard practice — verbal commands, time, distance, and tactical positioning are preferred over immediate physical force. Options (b), (c), (d) invert or distort the de-escalation framework that has become central to California use-of-force law.

6. Penal Code §692 provides that lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made by:

Penal Code §692 states lawful resistance to a public offense may be made by '(1) The party about to be injured; (2) Other parties.' This is the statutory foundation for self-defense and defense of others in California. Subsequent sections (§693 for the party injured, §694 for other parties) provide that resistance must be proportionate — sufficient to prevent the offense, but no more. Options (b), (c), (d) wrongly restrict the universal right of resistance recognized in §692.

7. Under Penal Code §693, resistance by the party about to be injured may be made:

Penal Code §693 authorizes resistance by the party about to be injured: (1) to prevent an offense against the person or family, and (2) to prevent an illegal injury to property in lawful possession. The amount of force must be proportionate; deadly force in defense of property alone is generally not permitted (see PC §197 distinctions). California does not impose a duty to retreat before standing one's ground (CALCRIM 505), although tactical retreat is often the safer choice. Options (a), (c), (d) misstate the law.

8. Under Penal Code §694, lawful resistance by 'other parties' (defense of others) authorizes:

Penal Code §694 authorizes 'other parties' to defend a person or property in the same circumstances as the party about to be injured, where the relationship listed in the statute applies (relative, family member, employer, employee, ward, master, mistress, guest). Modern California jurisprudence (CALCRIM 505) extends defense-of-others to any reasonably believed innocent third party. Force must be reasonable and proportionate. Options (a), (c), (d) wrongly restrict the right of defense of others.