West Virginia Real Estate Broker Exam — All Questions

A new environmental ordinance leaves a landowner with no economically viable use of a parcel, although the government takes no title to it. The owner's strongest constitutional claim is:

• a.The ordinance is void because zoning cannot restrict use
• b.A regulatory taking entitling the owner to payment✓
• c.Escheat has occurred and the state now owns the parcel
• d.Spot zoning, since only this parcel lost its value

Regulation that goes so far it denies an owner all economically viable use is treated as a regulatory taking, and just compensation is owed even though the government never took title. Arguing that zoning simply cannot restrict use fails, because regulating land is a valid exercise of the police power and owners have no right to the most profitable use. Escheat moves property to the state only when an owner dies with no will and no heirs, which has nothing to do with an ordinance. Spot zoning describes singling out one parcel for a different classification, not a general environmental rule applied to a class of land.

Reviewing a title report, a broker finds an old recorded covenant, written decades ago, that bars resale of the lot to members of a specified race. Its legal effect today is:

• a.It binds the buyer because it was recorded before purchase
• b.It is void, so a court will never enforce it or enjoin it✓
• c.It stays valid until the homeowners association removes it
• d.It is enforceable by the association but not by an owner

A private restriction that discriminates on a protected basis is void and unenforceable under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, so no court will order compliance or enjoin a violation, and the association has no power the courts would back. Recording rescues nothing, because an illegal restriction gains no force from sitting in the public record. No association vote is required to strip it of effect, although many states let an owner have the language formally struck. Valid CC&Rs, by contrast, are enforced privately by injunction brought by an owner or the association. A broker must never repeat or give effect to such language.

A grantor signs and notarizes a deed naming a nephew as grantee, locks it in a safe deposit box, and tells no one. The grantor later dies. What is the deed's effect?

• a.Title passed when the grantor signed the deed
• b.Title passed because the deed was acknowledged
• c.No title passed, because delivery never occurred✓
• d.Title passes when the estate later records it

A deed operates only when the grantor delivers it with the present intent to pass title and the grantee accepts, and both must happen while the grantor is alive. Signing accomplishes nothing while the instrument stays under the grantor's control in a box no one knows about. Acknowledgment before a notary serves recording, not validity, so notarizing it changes nothing here. An estate representative cannot supply the delivery the grantor failed to make, and recording an undelivered deed does not revive it. The nephew takes only through the will or the intestacy statute, which is why closings hand over the executed deed rather than merely signing it.

A deed is signed by a competent grantor and handed to a grantee who accepts it, but the grantor's signature was never notarized. As between those two parties, the deed is:

• a.Void, since notarizing is a validity requirement
• b.Valid, though it cannot be recorded as it stands✓
• c.Valid only if the grantee later pays a recording fee
• d.Voidable at the option of the grantor's creditors

Acknowledgment is a recording requirement, not an element of a valid deed. Delivered and accepted, the deed transfers title between grantor and grantee even with no notary, but the recorder will reject it, leaving the grantee exposed to later purchasers and lienholders who record first. Calling it void confuses the two ideas: validity turns on a competent grantor, an identifiable grantee, words of conveyance, an adequate legal description, the grantor's signature, and delivery and acceptance. Paying a fee cannot cure a missing acknowledgment, because the recorder cannot accept the instrument at all. Creditors of the grantor gain no power to undo a completed conveyance.

In a deed, which clause opens with the words 'to have and to hold' and defines the extent of the estate the grantee is receiving?

• a.The granting clause containing the words of conveyance
• b.The habendum clause, following the granting clause✓
• c.The acknowledgment taken before a notary public officer
• d.The legal description identifying the land conveyed

The habendum clause follows the granting clause, begins with the traditional phrase 'to have and to hold,' and spells out the estate conveyed, for example a fee simple absolute or a life estate. The granting clause holds the words of conveyance that actually transfer the interest and names the grantee. The acknowledgment is the notary's certificate that the signature is genuine, which the recorder requires but the transfer does not. The legal description identifies the land by metes and bounds, lot and block, or government survey, and it fixes what is conveyed rather than how much of an estate. Reading both clauses tells a broker exactly what the buyer is getting.

A relocation company that has owned a home for three months conveys it, warranting title only against defects that arose during its own ownership. The deed it delivers is a:

• a.Bargain and sale deed implying ownership without covenants
• b.General warranty deed covering the entire chain of title
• c.Quitclaim deed conveying only the interest actually held
• d.Special (limited) warranty deed covering the grantor's period✓

Warranting only against defects created or suffered while the grantor held title describes the special or limited warranty deed, the customary instrument for corporate, relocation, and fiduciary sellers who cannot vouch for what earlier owners did. A general warranty deed reaches back through the whole history of the property and offers the broadest protection, which is more than this seller is giving. A quitclaim carries no warranties at all and passes only whatever interest the signer happens to hold. A bargain and sale deed implies that the grantor owns the property but adds few or no covenants. A buyer taking narrower covenants should lean on an owner's title policy.

A title search shows that a seller's former spouse may still hold a possible interest in the property. What is the usual instrument used to release that interest and clear the record?

• a.A quitclaim deed from the former spouse✓
• b.A general warranty deed from the former spouse
• c.A trustee's deed issued after a foreclosure
• d.A correction deed fixing the legal description

A quitclaim releases whatever interest the signer may hold, with no warranties attached, which makes it the standard tool for removing a cloud such as a possible marital interest, a stale easement claim, or a name discrepancy. Demanding a general warranty deed asks the former spouse to guarantee title he or she may never have owned, and it is normally refused. A trustee's deed is what the trustee under a deed of trust issues to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. A correction deed reforms a mistake in an earlier deed between the same parties and cannot release an outsider's claim.

A court-appointed personal representative sells a decedent's home during probate, and the buyer's broker asks what instrument will convey title. The answer is:

• a.A trustee's deed given after a nonjudicial foreclosure
• b.A sheriff's deed issued following a judicial sale
• c.A general warranty deed with full title covenants
• d.An executor's or personal representative's deed✓

Estate property is conveyed by an executor's deed when a will names the executor, or by a personal representative's or administrator's deed when the court makes the appointment; these deeds recite the court authority and give only limited covenants. A trustee's deed comes from the trustee under a deed of trust after a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. A sheriff's deed, called a referee's deed in some states, follows a judicial sale ordered by a court. A general warranty deed is not used, because a fiduciary will not personally guarantee title against the acts of the decedent or of owners further back in the chain.

After closing under a general warranty deed, a buyer discovers a recorded utility easement that the deed never disclosed. Which covenant did the grantor breach?

• a.Quiet enjoyment, a promise against eviction by better title
• b.Seisin, a promise that the grantor owns the estate conveyed
• c.Against encumbrances, a promise of no undisclosed burdens✓
• d.Further assurance, a promise to sign curative papers

The covenant against encumbrances promises that no liens, easements, or similar burdens exist beyond those the deed discloses, so a recorded easement left unmentioned breaches it at the moment of delivery. Seisin promises the grantor actually owns the estate being conveyed, which is not the trouble when ownership is sound but burdened. Quiet enjoyment shields the grantee from later eviction by someone holding superior title, and an easement holder's use is not an eviction. Further assurance obliges the grantor to sign additional documents needed to perfect title. A general warranty deed carries all of these along with the right to convey and warranty forever.

A neighbor has openly farmed and fenced a strip of an absentee owner's land, excluding others and never asking permission. To take title by adverse possession the neighbor must prove:

• a.Payment of the owner's property taxes for every year
• b.Open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive possession✓
• c.A written agreement signed by the record title owner
• d.A recorded deed describing the disputed strip of land

Adverse possession requires possession that is open and notorious, continuous, hostile in the sense of being without permission, and exclusive, held for the statutory period set by state law. Some states add payment of taxes or color of title, but those elements are not universal, so a broker should never assume them from another state's rule. A written agreement from the record owner would destroy the claim outright, since permission defeats hostility. Recording a deed creates no possession and cannot manufacture the required years of use. Adverse possession is one form of involuntary alienation, alongside descent, escheat, foreclosure, eminent domain, and accretion.

An owner dies leaving no will, and after a diligent search no heirs can be located. A broker asked to list the property should understand that title:

• a.Passes by devise to the beneficiaries named in a will
• b.Descends to the decedent's nearest surviving creditors
• c.Vests permanently in the administrator the court appoints
• d.Escheats to the state, an involuntary transfer of title✓

Escheat is the state's claim to property when an owner dies intestate and no heirs can be found, and it is a classic involuntary transfer rather than a voluntary one by deed or will. Devise is a gift of real property by will, so it cannot operate where there is no will and no named beneficiary. Descent carries property to heirs under the intestacy statute, but creditors are paid as claimants out of the estate and never inherit the land itself. An administrator has authority to manage and convey estate property during probate, not to own it permanently. Each state sets its own escheat procedure and waiting period.

A search reveals an old mortgage of record that was paid off but never released, and the lender no longer exists. Which step clears that cloud so title is marketable?

• a.Ordering an abstract of title with an attorney's opinion
• b.Buying an owner's title policy that insures over it
• c.Filing a quiet title action asking a court to clear it✓
• d.Recording a correction deed signed by the current seller

A quiet title action asks a court to determine ownership and extinguish a stale or unreleasable claim, which is the practical cure when the mortgagee has vanished and no release can be obtained. An abstract of title with an attorney's opinion summarizes and evaluates the recorded chain; it reports the cloud rather than removing it, and it offers no indemnity. An owner's policy may insure over a known risk, but insurance pays for loss and leaves the defect on the record for the next buyer to confront. A correction deed fixes a drafting error between the original parties and cannot release a third party's lien.

A seller deeds a parcel to one buyer and later deeds the same parcel to a second buyer, who records first. Which framework decides who owns the land?

• a.A federal recording statute applied in all fifty states
• b.The state's recording act, race, notice, or race-notice✓
• c.The order in which the two deeds were signed and dated
• d.The county recorder's discretion over competing claims

Priority between competing grantees is governed by the recording act of the state where the land lies, and the schemes differ: a pure race state protects whoever records first, a notice state protects a later purchaser who took without notice of the earlier deed, and a race-notice state protects one who took without notice and recorded first. No federal statute governs land recording. Signing dates do not decide the contest, which is precisely why a public recording system exists. Recorders act ministerially and have no power to resolve claims. Because the gap between closing and recording is the danger zone, a broker should press for prompt recording.

A buyer pays for a lender's title policy at closing and asks the broker whether it also protects the buyer's equity in the home. The correct answer is that the policy:

• a.Protects both parties equally up to the full purchase price
• b.Protects the buyer once the mortgage has been fully repaid
• c.Protects the buyer against defects arising after closing
• d.Protects only the lender, declining with the balance✓

A lender's, or mortgagee's, policy insures only the lender's security interest, and its coverage shrinks as the principal is paid down, ending altogether when the loan is satisfied. It never covers the buyer's equity, which is why a separate owner's policy is offered at closing for a one-time premium and lasts as long as the insured holds an interest. Repaying the mortgage does not convert the lender's coverage into the buyer's; it extinguishes it. And no title policy insures defects that first arise after its date. Brokers should explain this plainly before a buyer waives owner's coverage to save money.

Six months after closing, a contractor the buyer hired records a mechanic's lien against the home. The buyer files a claim under the owner's title policy. The insurer will most likely:

• a.Deny, because the defect arose after the policy was issued✓
• b.Pay, because owner's policies cover all future liens
• c.Pay, because the standard exceptions were removed
• d.Deny, because only a lender may file a title claim

Title insurance looks backward: it covers defects that already existed when the policy was issued but were not discovered or excepted, not events that happen later. A lien for work the buyer ordered after closing is a new problem the buyer must resolve directly. Buying extended coverage removes standard exceptions and broadens what is insured as of the policy date, but it does not push coverage forward in time. Owners plainly may claim under their own policies; the lender's policy is the one limited to the lender. Extended coverage typically depends on a current survey, which reveals encroachments and boundary issues a records search alone cannot.

A buyer tours a house and finds an occupant who is not the seller living there under an unrecorded lease. What kind of notice does that occupancy give the buyer?

• a.Actual notice, given by the seller's written disclosure
• b.Constructive notice, given by the public record
• c.No notice at all, since the lease was not recorded
• d.Inquiry notice, requiring the buyer to ask about it✓

Someone in possession who is not the seller puts a buyer on inquiry notice: the buyer is charged with whatever a reasonable investigation of that occupancy would have turned up, including an unrecorded lease or an option to purchase. Actual notice is what a party genuinely knows, typically from a disclosure or a conversation, and no one has told this buyer anything. Constructive notice comes from the public record, which by definition cannot reveal an unrecorded lease. Treating an unrecorded interest as invisible is the classic error, because possession is itself notice. A broker should always ask who occupies a property and on what terms.

Under the West Virginia Real Estate License Act, the Commission's audit authority extends to:

• a.only brokerages that are the subject of a pending written complaint
• b.only trust fund accounts held at a West Virginia financial institution
• c.only licensees who have been disciplined within the preceding two years
• d.brokerage offices, education providers, and any other regulated person✓

W. Va. Code §30-40-7(q) lists among the Commission's general powers that it "may perform compliance audits on real estate brokerage offices, education providers or any other person regulated by the commission." The authority is drawn by who is regulated, not by who is accused. Limiting audits to brokerages under complaint confuses the audit power with the separate examination power in §30-40-7(k), which does turn on a pending complaint and is expressly confined to the violation charged. Limiting them to trust accounts drops education providers, whom the same clause names. And limiting them to previously disciplined licensees would leave the Commission unable to audit the licensee who has never been caught, which is the point of a compliance audit.

A Commission representative arrives at a broker's office during business hours and asks to see the trust fund account records. The broker must:

• a.provide only records for transactions that have already closed and been recorded
• b.require the representative to produce a subpoena before any record is produced
• c.open the records, which the statute keeps open during regular business hours✓
• d.forward the records to the Commission's office within thirty days of the request

W. Va. Code §30-40-18(h) requires the broker to keep records of all funds deposited into the trust fund account and provides that "[a]ll records shall be open to inspection by the commission or its duly authorized representative at all times during regular business hours at the broker's place of business." Rule 174-1-10.3 repeats that the records are open to inspection at the broker's usual place of business and adds that the broker must give the Commission enough space to inspect without interference. Demanding a subpoena reads the statute backwards: the Commission has subpoena power under §30-40-7(d), but it does not need it to see records the law already declares open. Restricting production to closed transactions would hide exactly the pending deposits an audit exists to trace. And a thirty-day mail-in substitutes a schedule of the broker's choosing for the on-site access the statute grants.

A consumer complaint against a West Virginia licensee is served on the licensee. The licensee's answer is due:

• a.within ten days of the date of service
• b.within twenty days of the date of service✓
• c.within thirty days of the date of service
• d.within sixty days of the date of service

W. Va. Code §30-40-20(c) directs the Commission to give the licensee a copy of the complaint and provides that "[t]he accused party shall file an answer within 20 days of the date of service," with failure to respond treated as an admission of the allegations. The same subsection lets the Commission grant an extension, so the deadline is firm but not unforgiving. Ten days is the answer period the fair housing statute uses for a respondent served by the Human Rights Commission, not the real estate figure. Thirty days is the minimum notice before a disciplinary hearing under §30-40-21(b), a different clock later in the same process. Sixty days appears nowhere in the complaint procedure.

A West Virginia consumer wants to file a complaint about a licensee's conduct at a closing that took place four years ago. Under the license act, the complaint is:

• a.timely, because no time limit applies to complaints about closings
• b.timely, because the five-year record retention period governs the filing deadline
• c.untimely, because complaints must be filed within one year of the acts alleged
• d.untimely, because complaints must be filed within two years of the acts alleged✓

W. Va. Code §30-40-20(a) provides that "no disciplinary action may be brought against a licensee upon any complaint that is filed more than two years after the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint," with a discovery rule of the same length for fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and tolling while an ongoing criminal matter keeps material evidence from the Commission. Saying no limit applies ignores the express bar. The five-year figure is the record retention period in §30-40-19(a)(28) and rule 174-1-10.3, which tells the broker how long to keep paper, not the consumer how long to complain. One year is the deadline for a housing discrimination complaint to the Human Rights Commission under §16B-18-11, a different statute and a different agency.

After the licensee answers and the investigation is reviewed, the Commission determines that probable cause exists. Under the license act, the Commission may then:

• a.refer the matter to a circuit court for a trial on the disciplinary charge
• b.revoke the license immediately without any further proceeding
• c.hold a hearing or dispose of the matter by consent agreement✓
• d.reopen the investigation only after the licensee requests a second review

W. Va. Code §30-40-20(f) states that on a probable cause determination "the commission may hold a hearing in compliance with §30-40-21 of this code or may dispose of the matter informally through a consent agreement or otherwise." Both routes are open, which is why most disciplinary files close by agreement rather than by hearing. Immediate revocation skips the hearing rights §30-40-21 supplies and the findings of fact and conclusions of law it requires. Sending the charge to circuit court misplaces the forum: the circuit court enters the picture on judicial review under §29A-5-4, after the agency has acted, not as the trial court for licensure discipline. And nothing conditions the Commission's next step on a request from the licensee.

The Commission schedules a disciplinary hearing. The license act requires that the hearing be held:

• a.no sooner than ten days after notice of the hearing is given
• b.no sooner than twenty days after notice of the hearing is given
• c.no sooner than thirty days after notice of the hearing is given✓
• d.no sooner than ninety days after notice of the hearing is given

W. Va. Code §30-40-21(b) provides that hearings "shall be held at a time and place determined by the commission, but in no event less than 30 days after the notice of hearing is given." The floor protects the licensee's ability to prepare; the Commission is free to set a later date. Ten days is not a real estate deadline at all. Twenty days is the licensee's period to answer the complaint under §30-40-20(c), which runs much earlier in the same file. Ninety days is the length of the candidate's examination authorization in the Pearson VUE handbook and has nothing to do with hearings.

The maximum administrative fine the West Virginia Real Estate Commission may impose is:

• a.$1,000 per day per violation✓
• b.$500 per day per violation
• c.$2,500 per day per violation
• d.$5,000 per day per violation

W. Va. Code §30-40-7(l) lets the Commission impose one or more sanctions and lists among them an "administrative fine not to exceed $1,000 per day per violation," alongside probation, restitution, censure, downgrade of license, additional education, and the return of compensation collected from an injured consumer. Because the cap is per day and per violation, a continuing violation can accumulate well past $1,000 in total. The $500 and $2,500 figures appear nowhere in the article. The $5,000 figure is a criminal fine ceiling from §30-40-22 for a second individual offense or a first entity offense, imposed by a court on conviction rather than by the Commission.

After a contested hearing the Commission finds that a licensee violated the license act. In addition to the sanction imposed, the Commission may:

• a.collect treble damages on behalf of the injured consumer
• b.order the licensee to serve a jail term of up to ninety days
• c.impose a lien on the licensee's brokerage real property
• d.require the licensee to pay the costs of the proceeding✓

W. Va. Code §30-40-21(g) provides that "[i]n addition to any other sanction imposed, the commission may require a licensee to pay the costs of the proceeding," which is why the outline pairs penalties with the cost of proceedings. The treble figure comes from §30-40-22(g), where a person who takes compensation for unlicensed acts faces a penalty of up to three times that compensation "as may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction" and recoverable by the aggrieved person, not assessed by the Commission. The ninety-day jail term is the criminal penalty for a first misdemeanor violation under §30-40-22(a), which follows a prosecution rather than an agency hearing. And no provision of the article gives the Commission lien authority over a licensee's property.

The Commission revokes a West Virginia broker's license. The effect on the associate brokers and salespersons affiliated with that broker is that their licenses are:

• a.automatically revoked, requiring each licensee to requalify by examination
• b.automatically suspended, and replaced free of charge under a new broker✓
• c.unaffected, because discipline reaches only the licensee who was charged
• d.placed on inactive status for one year before any transfer is permitted

W. Va. Code §30-40-19(e) provides that "[t]he revocation of a broker's license shall automatically suspend the license of every associate broker and salesperson affiliated with the broker," and adds that the Commission shall issue a replacement license to a new broker without charge on a proper application filed during the same license term. The suspension follows from the fact that these licensees may practice only under a broker; the free replacement keeps them from paying for their broker's misconduct. Revoking their licenses outright and demanding re-examination reads a harsher result than the statute writes. Saying they are unaffected ignores the supervision structure the article is built on. And a mandatory year of inactive status appears nowhere in the article.

A West Virginia real estate license issued in February expires on:

• a.June 30, the last day of the license year✓
• b.December 31 of the year it was issued
• c.the anniversary of the date it was issued
• d.February 28 of the following calendar year

Rule 174-1-8.1 states that "[a]ll licenses expire on June 30 regardless of the date the license was issued," and rule 174-1-3.1 sets the license year as beginning July 1 and ending June 30. W. Va. Code §30-40-17(c)(5) says the same thing from the certificate side: the license is valid for a period coinciding with the fiscal year. Rule 174-1-3.1 also provides that fees are not prorated, so the February licensee pays the full fee for a short first term. An anniversary date is how many states run renewals but not West Virginia. December 31 is the last day of the late renewal window under rule 174-1-8.2, which begins only after the license has already expired.

A West Virginia salesperson misses the June 30 renewal deadline. Under the Commission's rules, the license may still be renewed:

• a.at any time, provided continuing education is current
• b.only after the Commission grants a written waiver for good cause
• c.within thirty days after expiration, with no additional fee
• d.on or before December 31 of the year it expired, with a late fee✓

Rule 174-1-8.2 provides that on payment of the appropriate renewal and late fees "an expired license may be renewed on or before December 31 of the year in which the license expired." The rule also warns that a licensee who keeps practicing while expired, and a broker who accepts that licensee's services, may be disciplined, so renewing late is not the same as being covered in the interval. Rule 174-2-2.5 grades the late fee by how far past the deadline the payment falls, from $50 through August 31 to $100 through December 31. An open-ended renewal ignores the December 31 cutoff in rule 174-1-8.3. There is no fee-free thirty-day grace period, and no good-cause waiver route for late renewal.

A West Virginia salesperson wants to move to a different brokerage. Before performing any licensed activity for the new broker, the salesperson must:

• a.file an application for change of responsible broker and have it approved✓
• b.obtain the written release of the former broker, which alone completes the transfer
• c.wait out a thirty-day interval between the two affiliations
• d.notify the Commission by email and begin work at the new brokerage the same day

W. Va. Code §30-40-17(b)(2) makes it "unlawful to perform any act contained in this article, either directly or indirectly, after affiliation has been terminated until the associate broker or salesperson has made application to the commission for a change of affiliated broker and the application is approved." Rule 174-1-9.4 fills in the steps: written notice to the current responsible broker, a properly executed application on the Commission's form, and the fee in Series 2, and rule 174-1-9.5 requires a sworn statement from the new responsible broker confirming the transfer. An emailed notice and a same-day start skips the approval the statute conditions practice on. A release from the former broker is not the operative act; the application and its approval are. And the rules impose no waiting interval between affiliations.

When a salesperson's affiliation with a West Virginia broker ends, the license certificate must be:

• a.returned by the broker to the Commission immediately✓
• b.returned by the broker to the departing salesperson immediately
• c.retained by the broker until the annual renewal is filed
• d.destroyed by the broker and reported on the next renewal

Rule 174-1-9.3 requires the responsible broker to keep the active license certificates of each salesperson and associate broker and, "[u]pon the separation of a licensee from the current responsible broker," to "immediately return the license certificate to the Commission for appropriate action" and notify the licensee that it has been returned. W. Va. Code §30-40-17(a)(4) and (5) impose the same custody and prompt-return duties on the broker. Handing the certificate to the departing salesperson defeats the point, since the Commission holds inactive certificates under rule 174-1-9.2. Holding it until renewal leaves a certificate outstanding for an affiliation that no longer exists. Destroying it substitutes the broker's judgment for the Commission's action on the license.

A West Virginia licensee did not renew and the license was not renewed by December 31 of the year it expired. That license is now:

• a.expired, and renewable on payment of the accumulated late fees
• b.inactive, and restorable by completing the missed continuing education
• c.cancelled, and the licensee must requalify by examination✓
• d.suspended, and reinstatable at the Commission's discretion without examination

W. Va. Code §30-40-4 defines "Cancelled" as "a license that was not renewed by December 31 of the year in which license expired," and rule 174-1-8.3 spells out the consequence: the license is cancelled and "the licensee shall be required to comply with all the requirements for obtaining a new license, including the examination requirement." Rule 174-2-2.5.4 says the same thing from the fee side, that licenses not renewed by December 31 cannot be renewed. "Expired" is the earlier and lesser status, defined in §30-40-4 as not renewed by July 1, and it is the status that the late fee cures. Inactive is a status a licensee elects, not one that arrives by neglect. Suspension is a disciplinary sanction imposed by the Commission under §30-40-19, not a consequence of an unpaid renewal.

A West Virginia licensee on inactive status is:

• a.authorized to refer clients to active licensees for a reduced fee
• b.not authorized to conduct real estate business but still required to meet continuing education
• c.authorized to complete transactions already under contract when the status changed
• d.not authorized to conduct real estate business and not required to meet continuing education✓

W. Va. Code §30-40-4 defines "Inactive" as "a licensee who is not authorized to conduct any real estate business and is not required to comply with any continuing education requirements," and rule 174-1-8.5.b repeats the education half. The tradeoff appears when the licensee wants to return: §30-40-16(c) and rule 174-1-8.5.b both require satisfactory evidence of the education that would have been required for active status, completed before the license goes back on active. Taking a referral fee is conducting real estate business for compensation, which the definition forecloses. So is closing out pending transactions. And requiring continuing education while inactive contradicts the definition's second half, which is exactly what makes the reactivation make-up rule necessary.

A West Virginia broker renewing an active license must complete continuing professional education of:

• a.seven hours, of which seven must be broker-level courses
• b.seven hours, of which three must be broker-level courses✓
• c.fourteen hours, of which three must be broker-level courses
• d.fourteen hours, of which seven must be broker-level courses

W. Va. Code §30-40-16(a) requires "seven hours of continuing professional education for each fiscal year, with each hour equaling 50 minutes of instruction" and adds that "[f]or brokers and associate brokers, three of the required seven hours shall be from the broker-level education curriculum approved by the commission." The broker's obligation is therefore the same seven hours every licensee owes, with three of them drawn from a narrower approved curriculum, rather than an enlarged total. Fourteen hours would double the statutory figure. Requiring all seven at broker level would leave no room for the general courses the section otherwise contemplates, including the courses §30-40-16(e) treats as approved when they come from the appraiser board, the Division of Highways, or the State Bar.

A West Virginia licensee plans to satisfy this year's continuing education with the same approved course taken for last year's renewal. Under the Commission's rules, that course:

• a.counts only if the licensee is on inactive status at the time
• b.counts, because the course carries current Commission approval
• c.counts for half credit toward the seven-hour requirement
• d.does not count, because it repeats the previous renewal's course✓

Rule 174-1-8.6 states that "[t]he courses taken to satisfy the then-current continuing education requirement shall not be the same as courses taken for the previous license renewal." The requirement is about new instruction, so the fact that a course is still approved and still offered does not make a repeat of it count. Rule 174-1-8.7 gives the rule teeth by letting the Commission audit any licensee's continuing education and demand proof. There is no half-credit provision anywhere in the series. And inactive status does not turn a repeated course into a qualifying one; under rule 174-1-8.5.b an inactive licensee owes no continuing education at all until reactivation.

An unlicensed person negotiates one property sale in West Virginia and expects a fee for doing it. Under the license act, that person:

• a.is outside the article, because a single transaction is not a course of business
• b.is outside the article unless the fee is actually paid
• c.is treated as a broker or salesperson subject to the article✓
• d.is treated as an exempt owner's representative for that transaction

W. Va. Code §30-40-23 provides that "[o]ne act by any person in consideration of receiving compensation, or with the expectation or intention of receiving such compensation, or upon the promise of receiving compensation" for any act or service in the article makes that person a broker, associate broker, or salesperson subject to the article. That is why the section is headed "Single act evidence of practice." A course-of-business threshold would let an unlicensed person work one deal at a time indefinitely. Requiring that the fee actually change hands ignores the words "expectation or intention," which reach the arrangement before payment. And the owner's representative exemptions in §30-40-5(c) run to people acting on their own behalf or as regular salaried employees, not to a stranger negotiating for a fee.

A broker licensed in Ohio wants to work on a West Virginia listing in cooperation with a licensed West Virginia broker. Before practicing brokerage in West Virginia, the Ohio broker must:

• a.file a cooperative agreement between the two brokers with the Commission
• b.register the Ohio license with the Commission and share the fee with the local broker
• c.obtain a West Virginia license from the Commission✓
• d.do nothing further, because affiliation with a West Virginia broker supplies the authority

W. Va. Code §30-40-3 makes it unlawful to act in the capacity of a broker, associate broker, or salesperson in West Virginia without a license, and then closes the obvious gap: "Prior to practicing real estate brokerage in this state, a license shall be obtained from the commission even if the person or entity is licensed in another state and is affiliated or otherwise associated with a licensed real estate broker in this state." West Virginia's route for the out-of-state licensee is §30-40-15, which recognizes the foreign license but still requires an application and a passing score on the West Virginia state law portion of the examination. A cooperative agreement, a registration, or a fee split are private arrangements that cannot substitute for the license the statute demands first.

A West Virginia salesperson wants to be affiliated with two different brokerages at the same time. Under the Commission's rules, the salesperson:

• a.may not do so, because a licensee may affiliate with only one brokerage
• b.may do so, but only with the written consent of both responsible brokers
• c.may do so under the single existing license, with no further filing
• d.may do so, but must hold a license and certificate for each brokerage✓

Rule 174-1-4.8 addresses this directly: "Licensees who choose to be affiliated with more than one brokerage must have a license and license certificate for each brokerage. These additional licenses have no additional requirements other than the payment of the appropriate license fee." The rule permits the arrangement and prices it, rather than forbidding it. Saying a licensee may affiliate with only one brokerage states the general expectation but not the rule the Commission actually wrote. Consent from both brokers is prudent practice and does not appear in the rule as the operative condition. And working two brokerages on one license is precisely what the second certificate exists to prevent, since §30-40-17(c)(2) requires a salesperson's certificate to show the broker with whom the licensee is affiliated.

Which of the following persons is expressly outside the West Virginia Real Estate License Act?

• a.an individual selling a building he owns, acting on his own behalf as owner✓
• b.an unlicensed assistant who shows listed homes and negotiates offers for a broker
• c.a person paid a finder's fee for introducing a buyer to a listing broker
• d.an unlicensed partner in a brokerage entity who lists property for the firm

W. Va. Code §30-40-5(c)(1) provides that the article does not apply to "[a]ny person acting on his or her own behalf as owner or lessor of real estate." The owner sells his own property for his own account, so there is no principal for whom he acts and no license interest to protect. An unlicensed assistant who shows homes and negotiates offers is doing the licensed acts listed in the definition of broker in §30-40-4, and rule 174-1-21.1.a makes the supervising broker answerable for letting it happen. A finder's fee for producing a buyer is compensation for "[d]irect[ing] or assist[ing] in the procuring of a prospect," which §30-40-4 places squarely inside the definition. And §30-40-12(c) requires each member or officer of an entity who will engage in the real estate business to be licensed.

A West Virginia attorney-at-law who has never held a real estate license applies for a broker's license. Under the license act, the attorney:

• a.is licensed as a broker on proof of good standing with the State Bar
• b.must first hold a West Virginia salesperson's license for two years
• c.is exempt from the license act and so cannot be issued a broker's license
• d.must still pass the written examination required for a broker's license✓

W. Va. Code §30-40-5(c)(3) exempts attorneys-at-law from the article but attaches a proviso: attorneys "shall be required to submit to the written examination required under §30-40-12 of this code in order to qualify for a broker's license," with a grandfather clause only for an attorney licensed as a broker before July 1, 1980. So the exemption covers practicing law without a real estate license; it does not hand over a broker's license. A letter of good standing does have a role, but a narrower one: §30-40-11(f) lets an attorney submit one instead of a state and national criminal history record check. Reading the exemption as a bar on licensure inverts it. And the two-year salesperson path is not imposed on the attorney by this subsection.

An unlicensed clerical employee of a West Virginia broker may, without a license, accept and process rental reservations for a period not to exceed:

• a.seven consecutive days
• b.thirty consecutive days✓
• c.fourteen consecutive days
• d.ninety consecutive days

W. Va. Code §30-40-5(c)(10) exempts a person "employed by a broker in a noncommissioned secretarial or clerical capacity" who in the normal course of employment may disseminate preprinted brokerage information, collect predetermined rental fees for prompt tender to the broker, make appointments, and "[a]ccept and process rental reservations or bookings for a period not to exceed 30 consecutive days in a manner and procedure predetermined by the broker." Two limits carry the exemption: the employee is noncommissioned, and the terms are set by the broker in advance rather than negotiated. The seven-, fourteen-, and ninety-day figures do not appear in the subsection; only the thirty-day booking limit does, and a longer letting would be the leasing of real estate that §30-40-4 places inside the definition of broker.

Under the West Virginia Real Estate License Act, the practice of real estate brokerage does not include:

• a.managing a rental property and collecting rent for an owner
• b.auctioning a leasehold interest in real estate for compensation
• c.procuring a prospect calculated to result in a real estate transaction
• d.the activities normally performed by an appraiser or home inspector✓

W. Va. Code §30-40-5(b) provides that the practice of brokerage "does not include the activities normally performed by an appraiser, mortgage company, lawyer, engineer, contractor, surveyor, home inspector, or other professional who may perform an ancillary service in conjunction with a real estate transaction." Each of those callings is credentialed elsewhere, and a broker's license neither authorizes nor covers their work. The other three answers are inside the definition of broker in §30-40-4, which reaches a person who for compensation "[l]ists, sells, purchases, exchanges, options, rents, manages, leases, or auctions any interest in real estate" or who "[d]irects or assists in the procuring of a prospect calculated or intended to result in a real estate transaction." Property management is named twice over, since §30-40-4 also defines property management as collecting rent and handling daily operations for an owner.

An unlicensed person sues a West Virginia seller in circuit court for a commission on a sale he arranged. Under the license act, the suit fails because the plaintiff cannot:

• a.prove that he held a valid broker's license at all times✓
• b.produce a written listing agreement signed by the seller
• c.show that the Commission approved the commission rate in advance
• d.demonstrate that he was a member of a multiple listing service

W. Va. Code §30-40-25 bars any action in a West Virginia court "for the recovery of compensation for the performance of any act or service for which a broker's license is required, without alleging and proving that he or she was the holder of a valid broker's license at all times during the performance or rendering of any act or service." The license is a pleading and proof element, not a defense the seller must raise. The same section carves out one route that remains open: an associate broker or salesperson may sue his own affiliated broker for compensation earned while affiliated. A missing listing agreement can defeat a claim on other grounds but is not what §30-40-25 turns on. The Commission does not approve commission rates. And multiple listing service membership is private and confers no right to sue.

A West Virginia salesperson closes a transaction and the buyer offers to pay her directly for her work. Accepting that payment would be:

• a.permissible if the salesperson reports it to her broker within ten days
• b.a ground for discipline, because only her broker may pay a salesperson✓
• c.permissible if the amount is disclosed on the closing statement
• d.a ground for discipline only if the broker objects to the arrangement

W. Va. Code §30-40-19(a)(16) makes it a ground for discipline when a licensee, "[i]n the case of an associate broker or salesperson," accepts compensation for any act specified in the article "from any person other than his or her broker." Rule 174-1-15.2 runs parallel on the collection side: no salesperson or associate broker may collect money in a real estate transaction, whether commission, deposit, payment, or rental, except in the name of and with the consent of the responsible broker. The point is that the brokerage, not the individual licensee, is the contracting party. Reporting the payment afterward, disclosing it at closing, or securing the broker's tolerance does not change who the payer is, and none of those steps appears in the subdivision.

A West Virginia seller proposes that the broker keep everything above $200,000 as her fee. Entering that agreement would be:

• a.permitted, because the parties may set compensation by contract
• b.a ground for discipline, because it is a net listing✓
• c.permitted if the arrangement is disclosed in writing to the buyer
• d.a ground for discipline only if the property sells above $200,000

W. Va. Code §30-40-19(a)(40) makes it a ground for discipline to obtain, negotiate, or attempt to obtain or negotiate "a contract whereby the broker is entitled to a commission only to the extent that the sales price exceeds a given amount, commonly referred to as a net listing." The words "attempt to obtain or negotiate" matter: the violation is complete when the broker pursues the arrangement, so it does not wait on a sale or on the price the property finally brings. Freedom of contract is the general rule for compensation, which is why the license act carves this one structure out of it: a net listing sets the broker's interest against the seller's in getting the highest price. Disclosure to the buyer addresses a different concern and does not cure the conflict with the seller.

A West Virginia licensee wants to offer buyers a closing-cost rebate. Under the Commission's rules, the licensee must disclose in writing the terms of the rebate and:

• a.the licensee's net commission after the rebate is paid
• b.the fair market value of the rebate being offered✓
• c.a comparison with rebates offered by competing brokerages
• d.the identity of the lender funding the buyer's loan

Rule 174-1-18.1 permits a licensee to offer rebates, inducements, or other discounts if the licensee discloses to the client or customer, clearly, conspicuously, and in writing, both "the terms of any rebate, inducement or other discount offered" and "the fair market value of any rebate, inducement or other discount offered," and offers them only with the responsible broker's written permission, under direct supervision, and in the broker's name. Rule 174-1-18.2 then forbids any undisclosed compensation, consideration, rebate, inducement, or discount. The licensee's own net commission is not what the rule makes disclosable. The lender's identity belongs to a different disclosure, the one rule 174-1-18 does not govern. And nothing requires a licensee to publish what competitors offer.

Before a West Virginia broker pays part of her compensation to the broker representing the other party to the transaction, she must:

• a.give written notice to all parties to the transaction✓
• b.obtain the Commission's written approval of the split
• c.record the co-brokerage agreement with the county clerk
• d.wait until the deed has been recorded and the file closed

Rule 174-1-10.5 requires that "[a] broker shall provide written notice to all parties prior to paying a portion of his or her compensation to a broker representing another party to the transaction." The notice must come first, which is what makes it useful to a client deciding what the arrangement means for the advice being given. The sharing itself is lawful: W. Va. Code §30-40-19(a)(14) forbids paying or receiving compensation from anyone other than the licensee's principal but expressly preserves "the sharing of compensation or other valuable consideration between licensed brokers." The Commission does not approve compensation splits, county clerks record instruments affecting title rather than fee arrangements, and delaying the notice until after closing defeats its purpose.

Under the Commission's advertising rule, an advertisement for a specific West Virginia property must include the company name, a phone number, the physical address of a licensed office location, and:

• a.the responsible broker's name and the term "Broker"✓
• b.the license number of the listing salesperson
• c.the name of every team member working the listing
• d.the expiration date of the listing agreement

Rule 174-1-17.1 requires each advertisement to include "the company name, the name of the responsible broker and the term 'Broker,' the physical address of a licensed office location, and a phone number." The one relaxation is for yard signs, which need not carry the office address. The rule identifies the brokerage that stands behind the advertisement, which is why the responsible broker's name and title are the required element rather than the individual licensee's number. West Virginia does not require license numbers in advertising. Team advertising is expressly excused from naming every member, provided at least one associate broker or salesperson is named with the correct title and any unlicensed member is marked "Non-Licensed." A listing's expiration date is a contract term, not an advertising disclosure.

A West Virginia team advertises a listing with the team name in large type. Under the Commission's advertising rule, the company name, the responsible broker's name, and the term "Broker" must appear in type:

• a.at least as large as the team name
• b.at least one inch in height
• c.no less than one quarter the size of the team name
• d.no less than half the size of the team name✓

Rule 174-1-17.1 provides that "[t]he company name, the name of the responsible broker, and the term 'Broker' shall be displayed no less than half the size of the names of the associate broker(s), salesperson(s), or team name in the advertisement." The requirement is proportional rather than absolute, so the brokerage identification scales with however prominently the team promotes itself. Equal size overstates the rule. The one-inch figure belongs to a different rule, 174-1-13.1, which governs the physical sign at the office entrance and requires lettering not less than one inch in height. A quarter-size floor would let the brokerage identification shrink to half of what the rule permits.

A West Virginia brokerage advertises listings on a social media page. Under the Commission's advertising rule, the required advertising information must be:

• a.included in the text of every individual post
• b.available on request from the responsible broker
• c.accessible with no more than two mouse clicks✓
• d.filed with the Commission before the page goes live

Rule 174-1-17.4 provides that the information required by sections 17.1 and 17.2 "must appear on the home page or the screen that is first seen by the viewer," and that "[t]his information must be accessible with no more than two mouse clicks when advertising on social media." The two-click allowance recognizes that a social platform controls its own layout while still keeping the brokerage identification within easy reach of the consumer. Requiring the full block in every post is stricter than the rule and is what the two-click provision exists to avoid. Making it available on request puts the burden on the consumer to ask. And the Commission does not preclear advertising pages.

A West Virginia salesperson buys online advertising for one of his listings under his own name and photograph only. Under the Commission's advertising rule, that advertisement is:

• a.proper, because the salesperson paid for the advertising personally
• b.improper, because all advertising must be in the name of the responsible broker✓
• c.proper, because the listing is already published in the multiple listing service
• d.improper only if the salesperson also omits his own license status

Rule 174-1-17.2 states that no salesperson, associate broker, or team "shall advertise any property under his, her, or their own name without the name of the responsible broker," and that all such advertising "must be under the direct supervision of and in the name of the responsible broker." Who paid for the advertisement does not change that; the licensed activity belongs to the brokerage. Publication in a multiple listing service is a private arrangement among members and does not satisfy the Commission's rule for the licensee's own advertising. Omitting license status is a separate defect under rule 174-1-17.1, so curing it would still leave the missing broker name, which is the violation the rule addresses first.

A West Virginia licensee places a "for sale" sign on a property he hopes to list, before any agreement with the owner. Under the license act, that conduct is:

• a.acceptable if the sign is removed within ten days
• b.a ground for discipline only if a buyer is misled by the sign
• c.acceptable if the owner has orally agreed to consider listing
• d.a ground for discipline, absent an agency relationship or consent✓

W. Va. Code §30-40-19(a)(10) makes it a ground for discipline to advertise or display "a 'for sale', 'for rent', or other such sign on any property without an agency relationship being established or without the owner's knowledge and written consent." The violation is complete when the sign goes up, so removing it later and the absence of any misled buyer are both beside the point. Oral agreement does not satisfy a provision that names written consent. The neighboring subdivision, §30-40-19(a)(11), covers the related abuse of advertising a property "on terms other than those authorized by the owner," which shows the same theme: the owner controls how the property is held out to the market.