Louisiana Real Estate Broker Exam — All Questions

A new environmental ordinance leaves a landowner with no economically viable use of a parcel, although the government takes no title to it. The owner's strongest constitutional claim is:

• a.The ordinance is void because zoning cannot restrict use
• b.A regulatory taking entitling the owner to payment✓
• c.Escheat has occurred and the state now owns the parcel
• d.Spot zoning, since only this parcel lost its value

Regulation that goes so far it denies an owner all economically viable use is treated as a regulatory taking, and just compensation is owed even though the government never took title. Arguing that zoning simply cannot restrict use fails, because regulating land is a valid exercise of the police power and owners have no right to the most profitable use. Escheat moves property to the state only when an owner dies with no will and no heirs, which has nothing to do with an ordinance. Spot zoning describes singling out one parcel for a different classification, not a general environmental rule applied to a class of land.

Reviewing a title report, a broker finds an old recorded covenant, written decades ago, that bars resale of the lot to members of a specified race. Its legal effect today is:

• a.It binds the buyer because it was recorded before purchase
• b.It is void, so a court will never enforce it or enjoin it✓
• c.It stays valid until the homeowners association removes it
• d.It is enforceable by the association but not by an owner

A private restriction that discriminates on a protected basis is void and unenforceable under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, so no court will order compliance or enjoin a violation, and the association has no power the courts would back. Recording rescues nothing, because an illegal restriction gains no force from sitting in the public record. No association vote is required to strip it of effect, although many states let an owner have the language formally struck. Valid CC&Rs, by contrast, are enforced privately by injunction brought by an owner or the association. A broker must never repeat or give effect to such language.

A grantor signs and notarizes a deed naming a nephew as grantee, locks it in a safe deposit box, and tells no one. The grantor later dies. What is the deed's effect?

• a.Title passed when the grantor signed the deed
• b.Title passed because the deed was acknowledged
• c.No title passed, because delivery never occurred✓
• d.Title passes when the estate later records it

A deed operates only when the grantor delivers it with the present intent to pass title and the grantee accepts, and both must happen while the grantor is alive. Signing accomplishes nothing while the instrument stays under the grantor's control in a box no one knows about. Acknowledgment before a notary serves recording, not validity, so notarizing it changes nothing here. An estate representative cannot supply the delivery the grantor failed to make, and recording an undelivered deed does not revive it. The nephew takes only through the will or the intestacy statute, which is why closings hand over the executed deed rather than merely signing it.

A deed is signed by a competent grantor and handed to a grantee who accepts it, but the grantor's signature was never notarized. As between those two parties, the deed is:

• a.Void, since notarizing is a validity requirement
• b.Valid, though it cannot be recorded as it stands✓
• c.Valid only if the grantee later pays a recording fee
• d.Voidable at the option of the grantor's creditors

Acknowledgment is a recording requirement, not an element of a valid deed. Delivered and accepted, the deed transfers title between grantor and grantee even with no notary, but the recorder will reject it, leaving the grantee exposed to later purchasers and lienholders who record first. Calling it void confuses the two ideas: validity turns on a competent grantor, an identifiable grantee, words of conveyance, an adequate legal description, the grantor's signature, and delivery and acceptance. Paying a fee cannot cure a missing acknowledgment, because the recorder cannot accept the instrument at all. Creditors of the grantor gain no power to undo a completed conveyance.

In a deed, which clause opens with the words 'to have and to hold' and defines the extent of the estate the grantee is receiving?

• a.The granting clause containing the words of conveyance
• b.The habendum clause, following the granting clause✓
• c.The acknowledgment taken before a notary public officer
• d.The legal description identifying the land conveyed

The habendum clause follows the granting clause, begins with the traditional phrase 'to have and to hold,' and spells out the estate conveyed, for example a fee simple absolute or a life estate. The granting clause holds the words of conveyance that actually transfer the interest and names the grantee. The acknowledgment is the notary's certificate that the signature is genuine, which the recorder requires but the transfer does not. The legal description identifies the land by metes and bounds, lot and block, or government survey, and it fixes what is conveyed rather than how much of an estate. Reading both clauses tells a broker exactly what the buyer is getting.

A relocation company that has owned a home for three months conveys it, warranting title only against defects that arose during its own ownership. The deed it delivers is a:

• a.Bargain and sale deed implying ownership without covenants
• b.General warranty deed covering the entire chain of title
• c.Quitclaim deed conveying only the interest actually held
• d.Special (limited) warranty deed covering the grantor's period✓

Warranting only against defects created or suffered while the grantor held title describes the special or limited warranty deed, the customary instrument for corporate, relocation, and fiduciary sellers who cannot vouch for what earlier owners did. A general warranty deed reaches back through the whole history of the property and offers the broadest protection, which is more than this seller is giving. A quitclaim carries no warranties at all and passes only whatever interest the signer happens to hold. A bargain and sale deed implies that the grantor owns the property but adds few or no covenants. A buyer taking narrower covenants should lean on an owner's title policy.

A title search shows that a seller's former spouse may still hold a possible interest in the property. What is the usual instrument used to release that interest and clear the record?

• a.A quitclaim deed from the former spouse✓
• b.A general warranty deed from the former spouse
• c.A trustee's deed issued after a foreclosure
• d.A correction deed fixing the legal description

A quitclaim releases whatever interest the signer may hold, with no warranties attached, which makes it the standard tool for removing a cloud such as a possible marital interest, a stale easement claim, or a name discrepancy. Demanding a general warranty deed asks the former spouse to guarantee title he or she may never have owned, and it is normally refused. A trustee's deed is what the trustee under a deed of trust issues to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. A correction deed reforms a mistake in an earlier deed between the same parties and cannot release an outsider's claim.

A court-appointed personal representative sells a decedent's home during probate, and the buyer's broker asks what instrument will convey title. The answer is:

• a.A trustee's deed given after a nonjudicial foreclosure
• b.A sheriff's deed issued following a judicial sale
• c.A general warranty deed with full title covenants
• d.An executor's or personal representative's deed✓

Estate property is conveyed by an executor's deed when a will names the executor, or by a personal representative's or administrator's deed when the court makes the appointment; these deeds recite the court authority and give only limited covenants. A trustee's deed comes from the trustee under a deed of trust after a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. A sheriff's deed, called a referee's deed in some states, follows a judicial sale ordered by a court. A general warranty deed is not used, because a fiduciary will not personally guarantee title against the acts of the decedent or of owners further back in the chain.

After closing under a general warranty deed, a buyer discovers a recorded utility easement that the deed never disclosed. Which covenant did the grantor breach?

• a.Quiet enjoyment, a promise against eviction by better title
• b.Seisin, a promise that the grantor owns the estate conveyed
• c.Against encumbrances, a promise of no undisclosed burdens✓
• d.Further assurance, a promise to sign curative papers

The covenant against encumbrances promises that no liens, easements, or similar burdens exist beyond those the deed discloses, so a recorded easement left unmentioned breaches it at the moment of delivery. Seisin promises the grantor actually owns the estate being conveyed, which is not the trouble when ownership is sound but burdened. Quiet enjoyment shields the grantee from later eviction by someone holding superior title, and an easement holder's use is not an eviction. Further assurance obliges the grantor to sign additional documents needed to perfect title. A general warranty deed carries all of these along with the right to convey and warranty forever.

A neighbor has openly farmed and fenced a strip of an absentee owner's land, excluding others and never asking permission. To take title by adverse possession the neighbor must prove:

• a.Payment of the owner's property taxes for every year
• b.Open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive possession✓
• c.A written agreement signed by the record title owner
• d.A recorded deed describing the disputed strip of land

Adverse possession requires possession that is open and notorious, continuous, hostile in the sense of being without permission, and exclusive, held for the statutory period set by state law. Some states add payment of taxes or color of title, but those elements are not universal, so a broker should never assume them from another state's rule. A written agreement from the record owner would destroy the claim outright, since permission defeats hostility. Recording a deed creates no possession and cannot manufacture the required years of use. Adverse possession is one form of involuntary alienation, alongside descent, escheat, foreclosure, eminent domain, and accretion.

An owner dies leaving no will, and after a diligent search no heirs can be located. A broker asked to list the property should understand that title:

• a.Passes by devise to the beneficiaries named in a will
• b.Descends to the decedent's nearest surviving creditors
• c.Vests permanently in the administrator the court appoints
• d.Escheats to the state, an involuntary transfer of title✓

Escheat is the state's claim to property when an owner dies intestate and no heirs can be found, and it is a classic involuntary transfer rather than a voluntary one by deed or will. Devise is a gift of real property by will, so it cannot operate where there is no will and no named beneficiary. Descent carries property to heirs under the intestacy statute, but creditors are paid as claimants out of the estate and never inherit the land itself. An administrator has authority to manage and convey estate property during probate, not to own it permanently. Each state sets its own escheat procedure and waiting period.

A search reveals an old mortgage of record that was paid off but never released, and the lender no longer exists. Which step clears that cloud so title is marketable?

• a.Ordering an abstract of title with an attorney's opinion
• b.Buying an owner's title policy that insures over it
• c.Filing a quiet title action asking a court to clear it✓
• d.Recording a correction deed signed by the current seller

A quiet title action asks a court to determine ownership and extinguish a stale or unreleasable claim, which is the practical cure when the mortgagee has vanished and no release can be obtained. An abstract of title with an attorney's opinion summarizes and evaluates the recorded chain; it reports the cloud rather than removing it, and it offers no indemnity. An owner's policy may insure over a known risk, but insurance pays for loss and leaves the defect on the record for the next buyer to confront. A correction deed fixes a drafting error between the original parties and cannot release a third party's lien.

A seller deeds a parcel to one buyer and later deeds the same parcel to a second buyer, who records first. Which framework decides who owns the land?

• a.A federal recording statute applied in all fifty states
• b.The state's recording act, race, notice, or race-notice✓
• c.The order in which the two deeds were signed and dated
• d.The county recorder's discretion over competing claims

Priority between competing grantees is governed by the recording act of the state where the land lies, and the schemes differ: a pure race state protects whoever records first, a notice state protects a later purchaser who took without notice of the earlier deed, and a race-notice state protects one who took without notice and recorded first. No federal statute governs land recording. Signing dates do not decide the contest, which is precisely why a public recording system exists. Recorders act ministerially and have no power to resolve claims. Because the gap between closing and recording is the danger zone, a broker should press for prompt recording.

A buyer pays for a lender's title policy at closing and asks the broker whether it also protects the buyer's equity in the home. The correct answer is that the policy:

• a.Protects both parties equally up to the full purchase price
• b.Protects the buyer once the mortgage has been fully repaid
• c.Protects the buyer against defects arising after closing
• d.Protects only the lender, declining with the balance✓

A lender's, or mortgagee's, policy insures only the lender's security interest, and its coverage shrinks as the principal is paid down, ending altogether when the loan is satisfied. It never covers the buyer's equity, which is why a separate owner's policy is offered at closing for a one-time premium and lasts as long as the insured holds an interest. Repaying the mortgage does not convert the lender's coverage into the buyer's; it extinguishes it. And no title policy insures defects that first arise after its date. Brokers should explain this plainly before a buyer waives owner's coverage to save money.

Six months after closing, a contractor the buyer hired records a mechanic's lien against the home. The buyer files a claim under the owner's title policy. The insurer will most likely:

• a.Deny, because the defect arose after the policy was issued✓
• b.Pay, because owner's policies cover all future liens
• c.Pay, because the standard exceptions were removed
• d.Deny, because only a lender may file a title claim

Title insurance looks backward: it covers defects that already existed when the policy was issued but were not discovered or excepted, not events that happen later. A lien for work the buyer ordered after closing is a new problem the buyer must resolve directly. Buying extended coverage removes standard exceptions and broadens what is insured as of the policy date, but it does not push coverage forward in time. Owners plainly may claim under their own policies; the lender's policy is the one limited to the lender. Extended coverage typically depends on a current survey, which reveals encroachments and boundary issues a records search alone cannot.

A buyer tours a house and finds an occupant who is not the seller living there under an unrecorded lease. What kind of notice does that occupancy give the buyer?

• a.Actual notice, given by the seller's written disclosure
• b.Constructive notice, given by the public record
• c.No notice at all, since the lease was not recorded
• d.Inquiry notice, requiring the buyer to ask about it✓

Someone in possession who is not the seller puts a buyer on inquiry notice: the buyer is charged with whatever a reasonable investigation of that occupancy would have turned up, including an unrecorded lease or an option to purchase. Actual notice is what a party genuinely knows, typically from a disclosure or a conversation, and no one has told this buyer anything. Constructive notice comes from the public record, which by definition cannot reveal an unrecorded lease. Treating an unrecorded interest as invisible is the classic error, because possession is itself notice. A broker should always ask who occupies a property and on what terms.

Which agency issues, renews, and disciplines real estate broker licenses in Louisiana?

• a.The Louisiana Department of Insurance
• b.The parish clerk of court where the broker practices
• c.The Louisiana Real Estate Commission (LREC)✓
• d.The Louisiana Association of Realtors

Real estate licensing in Louisiana is a state regulatory function. R.S. 37:1432(A) creates the Louisiana Real Estate Commission within the office of the governor, and R.S. 37:1435(A) gives it the power to regulate the issuance of real estate licenses, registrations and certificates, to censure licensees, and to suspend or revoke what it has issued; R.S. 37:1436(B) makes practicing without its license unlawful. The Louisiana Realtors association is a private trade body: it can set standards for the members who join it, but it cannot grant or revoke the state credential that lets someone practice. The Department of Insurance regulates a different licensed industry entirely, so a real estate licensing matter filed there would have landed in the wrong place. And a parish clerk of court works in a local records-and-courts capacity for one parish — R.S. 37:1434 puts the commission's domicile in Baton Rouge and its jurisdiction over the whole state.

Under R.S. 37:1432, the Louisiana Real Estate Commission is made up of:

• a.Seven brokers elected by the licensees of each supreme court district
• b.Nine members chosen by the Louisiana Realtors association
• c.Five members appointed by the commissioner of insurance
• d.Eleven members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate✓

R.S. 37:1432(A) creates the commission within the office of the governor and fixes it at eleven members whom the governor appoints and submits to the Senate for confirmation, with seats allocated by supreme court district plus at-large and congressional-district appointees; each serves a four-year term and, under Subsection C, must have worked as a broker for at least five years before appointment. Election by the licensees is not how the seats are filled, and the number seven belongs to the supreme court districts from which some members are drawn, not to the size of the body. A private trade association nominates no one to a state regulatory board, so a slate chosen by the Realtors would have no statutory footing. And the commissioner of insurance regulates a different industry entirely; appointment power over real estate regulators lies with the governor.

A commission investigator arrives at a broker's office to examine the firm's transaction records. Under R.S. 37:1435(D), the inspection may take place:

• a.Only under a search warrant from the district court
• b.Between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., excluding weekends and holidays✓
• c.Only during an audit noticed thirty days ahead
• d.At any hour, since escrow records are public

R.S. 37:1435(D) authorizes the commission to require licensees to keep records and to inspect them at the licensee's offices through its duly authorized representatives, and it sets the window: between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., with Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays excluded. The same subsection lets the commission subpoena the records, which is why no warrant is needed — records inspection is a condition of holding the license, not a criminal search. Nor does the statute build in an advance-notice period; a month's warning would defeat the point of an unannounced look at trust-account records. And the records are the broker's private business files held for regulatory inspection, not public documents open to anyone at any hour.

The commission finds that a licensee violated the license law. Beyond censure, suspension, or revocation, R.S. 37:1455 lets it levy a civil penalty of up to:

• a.$5,000✓
• b.$1,000
• c.$10,000
• d.$25,000

R.S. 37:1455(A) lists the sanctions in one sentence: the commission may censure, conditionally or unconditionally suspend or revoke a license, impose additional continuing education, and levy fines or civil penalties not to exceed five thousand dollars. One thousand understates the ceiling and would leave the commission unable to reach the more serious conduct the same section describes, such as commingling or converting a client's money. Ten thousand and twenty-five thousand overstate it; the legislature set a single figure and the commission cannot exceed it by treating one course of conduct as several. Note also that a fine is a regulatory penalty paid to the state — compensating a wronged consumer is handled separately, through the recovery fund in R.S. 37:1461.

The commission revokes a sponsoring broker's license. The licenses of the salespersons that broker sponsored are:

• a.Unaffected, because discipline is personal to the broker who committed the violation
• b.Transferred by the commission to the nearest branch office of the same firm
• c.Automatically suspended, and the broker must return them within seventy-two hours✓
• d.Revoked permanently along with the license of the sponsoring broker

R.S. 37:1448(B) makes the consequence automatic: revoking or suspending a broker's license suspends the license of every associate broker and salesperson sponsored by that broker, and the broker has seventy-two hours from notification of the final action to return their licenses to the commission. Treating the discipline as personal misses why sponsorship exists — a sponsored licensee practices only through the broker's license, so when that license stops, the authority it carried stops with it. The commission does not reassign licensees to another office; obtaining a new sponsoring broker is the licensee's own step, made under R.S. 37:1441. And the sponsored licenses are suspended rather than revoked, so a salesperson who did nothing wrong keeps the ability to resume work once a new sponsor is in place.

To qualify for a Louisiana broker license, an applicant must generally have been actively licensed for at least:

• a.2 years licensed, plus a 30-hour broker responsibilities course
• b.1 year licensed, plus 90 hours of prelicense instruction
• c.4 years licensed, 2 immediately preceding, plus 150 hours✓
• d.6 months as an unlicensed assistant, plus 60 hours of instruction

R.S. 37:1437(C)(1)(a)(i) requires a broker applicant to have first been licensed for four years, with two of the four occurring immediately preceding submission of the application, and to have completed at least 150 hours of approved instruction; Subparagraph (b) requires at least 30 of those hours to emphasize broker responsibilities. LAC 46:LXVII §5331(B) delivers that as Real Estate 201 (90 hours), Real Estate 202 (30 hours), and the mandatory Real Estate 203 broker responsibilities course (30 hours). Two years understates the licensure period by half, and the 30-hour course it names is one component of the requirement rather than the whole of it. One year with 90 hours describes the salesperson standard in R.S. 37:1437(C)(4)(a), not the broker standard. And time worked as an unlicensed assistant cannot count at all: the statute measures years of active licensure, so an unlicensed period contributes nothing however many classroom hours accompany it.

An unlicensed person, for a fee, performs a single act of real estate activity for another. Under R.S. 37:1436:

• a.No violation occurs unless the person holds himself out to the public as a broker
• b.No violation occurs unless the person performs three or more such acts in a year
• c.The single act is itself a violation of the license law✓
• d.A violation occurs only if the transaction actually closes and a fee is paid

R.S. 37:1436(D) says it in terms: anyone who offers, attempts, agrees to perform, or performs any single act described in the Chapter for another with the expectation of valuable consideration is deemed a licensee within its meaning, and the commission of a single act by a person not licensed constitutes a violation. Holding oneself out as a broker is not the trigger; the statute reaches the conduct, so a person who never advertises at all is caught by the first act he performs. There is likewise no tolerance of a few transactions before the law applies — a numerical threshold would let an unlicensed person work part of every year with impunity. And closing is irrelevant, because Subsection B reaches activity undertaken in the expectation or upon the promise of receiving a fee, whether or not the deal is ever completed.

Which of these may lawfully be done in Louisiana without a real estate license?

• a.An owner selling or leasing property that she owns herself✓
• b.A neighbor paid a finder's fee for producing a buyer for a house
• c.An assistant negotiating lease terms on behalf of a brokerage's client
• d.A relocation company collecting a fee for referring a buyer to a broker

R.S. 37:1438(A)(1) and (A)(5) place the owner outside the licensing chapter entirely: an unlicensed person who is the owner or lessor of the property and performs acts of ownership regarding it, or any entity that sells, exchanges, leases, or manages its own property, needs no license. The exemption turns on acting for oneself, which is exactly what the other three do not do. A neighbor paid to produce a buyer is performing an act for another in the expectation of consideration, the conduct R.S. 37:1436(B) makes unlawful without a license. An assistant may perform the narrow clerical and showing tasks listed in R.S. 37:1438(A)(6), but negotiating lease terms is not among them. And a relocation company demanding a referral fee without reasonable cause is separately made unlawful by R.S. 37:1447(A), which also treats the demand as interference with a brokerage relationship.

Apart from education and examination, R.S. 37:1437(C) conditions an individual broker or salesperson license on the applicant being:

• a.At least twenty-one years old and a resident of Louisiana for one year
• b.A United States citizen who has completed two years of college
• c.At least twenty-five years old, with no residency requirement imposed
• d.Eighteen years old and a high school graduate or equivalency holder✓

R.S. 37:1437(C) opens with two flat bars: no individual broker or salesperson license issues to a person who has not attained the age of eighteen, and none issues to a person who is not a high school graduate or the holder of a certificate of high school equivalency. Twenty-one is not the age the statute names, and Louisiana imposes no waiting period for residency — Subsection E expressly lets a nonresident obtain a license and practice here on conditions the commission prescribes. College is not required either; the education the statute demands is the prelicense coursework counted in hours, which an applicant may complete without any degree. And twenty-five appears nowhere in the section; raising the age bar that high would exclude applicants the legislature deliberately admitted at eighteen.

A Louisiana real estate license is effective for one year. Under R.S. 37:1442 it must be renewed:

• a.On or before September thirtieth, expiring that December thirty-first✓
• b.On or before the anniversary of the issue date
• c.On or before June thirtieth, in a two-year cycle
• d.Within thirty days after the licensee's birthday

R.S. 37:1442(A)(1) sets all three dates in one place: each license is effective for a period of one year, is renewed timely on or before September thirtieth annually, and expires on December thirty-first following the date it was issued. The renewal deadline and the expiration date are therefore different days, which is the point of the provision — the three-month gap is the window in which a late renewal can still be cured. Renewing on the issue-date anniversary would give every licensee a personal deadline, whereas Louisiana uses one common date for all. There is no biennial cycle here; Subparagraph (a) makes the term one year, not two. And nothing in the section keys renewal to the licensee's birthday, a device some other occupational statutes use but this one does not.

A broker terminates the sponsorship of one of his salespersons. Under R.S. 37:1441, the terminating party must submit the termination form to the commission within:

• a.Thirty calendar days
• b.Five calendar days✓
• c.Ten business days
• d.Seventy-two hours

R.S. 37:1441(A) requires the terminating party to submit a form attesting to the termination within five calendar days, and Paragraph (1) attaches the consequence that matters more than the deadline: once that form is submitted the salesperson's license is no longer in force and he may conduct no real estate activity until he obtains a new sponsoring broker. Thirty days would leave a month in which no one at the commission knows who, if anyone, is answerable for the licensee's work. Ten business days is a different measure as well as a longer one — the statute counts calendar days, so weekends and holidays are included. Seventy-two hours is the deadline in a neighboring provision, R.S. 37:1448(B), for returning licenses after a broker's license is suspended or revoked, which is a different event with a different trigger.

Each year an active Louisiana broker or salesperson must complete continuing education of:

• a.Eight hours, in subjects the licensee chooses
• b.Twenty hours, ten of them in agency law
• c.Sixteen hours, eight of them in fair housing
• d.Twelve hours, four in commission-specified subjects✓

R.S. 37:1437(C)(5)(a) fixes the annual obligation at twelve hours of continuing education pertaining to matters including licensing, appraisal, finance, taxes, zoning, and environmental quality, and requires a minimum of four of those hours to be in subjects the commission specifies. The same paragraph forbids the commission from letting a licensee complete fewer than twelve, so eight hours would fall short of the floor the statute sets, and leaving the whole of it to the licensee's choice would defeat the mandatory-topic requirement. Twenty hours and sixteen hours both overstate the total; the subjects they name are real enough as course content, but neither the agency figure nor the fair-housing figure appears in the statute. Post-license hours may be used to satisfy eight of the twelve, but the same paragraph says they never satisfy the mandatory topics.

Louisiana's 150-hour broker prelicense education requirement is delivered by certified real estate schools as:

• a.One continuous 150-hour broker course
• b.Real Estate 201 (90 hrs), 202 (30 hrs), and 203 (30 hrs)✓
• c.Real Estate 101 (90 hrs) plus 60 elective hours
• d.Three 50-hour modules chosen by each school

LAC 46:LXVII §5331(B) structures the broker requirement as three named courses: Real Estate 201, a 90-hour course on basic real estate fundamentals; Real Estate 202, a 30-hour course limited to license law, commission rules, the law of agency in Title 9, civil law as it pertains to real estate, and ethics; and Real Estate 203, the mandatory 30-hour course on broker responsibilities that R.S. 37:1437(C)(1)(b) requires. A single undivided course would not satisfy that 30-hour broker-responsibilities carve-out, which the rule states separately for a reason. Real Estate 101 is the 90-hour salesperson course in §5331(A) and is not part of the broker sequence. And the subject matter is not left to the schools; the rule prescribes what each course must contain.

In Louisiana, a licensed salesperson or associate broker may lawfully accept a real estate commission:

• a.From the LREC as a state disbursement
• b.Only from the sponsoring broker who holds their license✓
• c.From the escrow agent at closing without the broker's involvement
• d.Directly from any buyer or seller in the transaction

R.S. 37:1446(F) is the rule in one line: an active real estate licensee shall not accept a commission or other valuable consideration for licensed activity from any person except their sponsoring or qualifying broker. Subsection A completes the circuit from the other end by forbidding any licensee to pay a commission to a person who is not licensed. So a buyer or seller paying the licensee directly would bypass the broker who is answerable for the transaction, and an escrow agent cutting a separate check to the licensee at closing does the same thing at the settlement table — Subsection E requires even compensation earned under a former broker to be transmitted through the current one. Payment from the Commission is a category error: the Commission licenses and disciplines, while a commission is private compensation earned under a brokerage agreement, not a disbursement of state money.

A Louisiana broker who operates a firm and supervises affiliated licensees is responsible for all of the following EXCEPT:

• a.Supervising the licensed activity of affiliated salespersons
• b.Maintaining the firm's trust/escrow account
• c.Retaining transaction records for the period required by LREC
• d.Personally guaranteeing each client a profit on resale✓

R.S. 37:1455(A)(10) makes guaranteeing, or authorizing any person to guarantee, future profits that may result from the resale of real property a cause for censure, suspension or revocation — no broker can lawfully promise a client a profit on resale. The other three are duties the law does impose. LAC 46:LXVII Section 1801 requires a broker who sponsors licensees to hold written policies and procedures ensuring that each sponsored licensee stays active and complies with the advertising and recordkeeping rules, and to maintain the sales escrow, rental trust and security deposit accounts. R.S. 37:1435(F) requires money received on behalf of clients to sit in a separate account, uncommingled with the licensee's own funds. And R.S. 37:1449(D) requires the broker to retain escrow bank statements, deposit slips, canceled checks and transaction documents, readily available and properly indexed, for five years. That supervisory and recordkeeping accountability is what the mandatory 30-hour Real Estate 203 Broker Responsibilities course of LAC 46:LXVII Section 5331(B)(3) exists to teach.

Under the Louisiana Residential Property Disclosure Act, the seller of residential property must generally provide the buyer with:

• a.A parish certificate showing the property taxes are paid current
• b.A completed property disclosure document listing known defects✓
• c.A certified appraisal of market value paid for by the seller
• d.A home warranty policy covering the major systems for one year

The Louisiana Residential Property Disclosure Act, R.S. 9:3196 et seq., requires the seller of residential real property to complete a property disclosure document on the form the Louisiana Real Estate Commission prescribes, disclosing at a minimum the known defects the Act defines in R.S. 9:3196(1) — conditions actually known to the seller that substantially affect value, impair health or safety, or shorten the property's normal life. R.S. 37:1455(A)(33) makes a licensee's failure to provide it a disciplinary cause. What the document reports is knowledge of condition, which is where the alternatives fall down. A tax certificate speaks to what is owed on the property, not to what is wrong with it. An appraisal is an opinion of value prepared for a lender or a party. And a warranty is an optional service contract someone may buy, not a disclosure of what the seller already knows.

A Louisiana broker who receives a client's deposit money must:

• a.Place it in a designated sales escrow/trust account✓
• b.Forward it immediately to the LREC for holding
• c.Deposit it into the broker's general business account
• d.Keep it in a personal safe deposit box until closing

R.S. 37:1435(F) gives the commission the right to require every licensee to deposit all monies received on behalf of clients in a separate account at a legally chartered financial institution, not commingled with the licensee's personal funds, and LAC 46:LXVII Section 2717 directs those funds into the appropriate sales escrow, rental trust or security deposit checking account. Depositing them into the general business account is commingling, which R.S. 37:1455(A)(6) makes a cause for suspension or revocation even when nothing is ultimately lost; failing to account for or properly disburse the money is separately actionable under (A)(4) and (A)(5). A personal safe deposit box is no better than the business account, because cash held outside any designated account can be neither reconciled nor inspected under R.S. 37:1435(D). And the commission regulates and inspects how brokers handle trust money — it is a regulator, not a depository. Note that Section 2713 permits only up to $2,500 of the broker's own money in each account, identified and used solely for bank service charges.

When a Louisiana salesperson receives an earnest-money deposit, the salesperson should:

• a.Deliver it promptly to the sponsoring broker✓
• b.Hold it personally until the seller accepts the offer
• c.Endorse it over to the buyer's attorney
• d.Deposit it into the salesperson's own account

R.S. 37:1455(A)(17) makes it a disciplinary cause for an associate broker or salesperson to fail to place, as soon after receipt as practicable, in the custody of his licensed broker any deposit money or other funds entrusted to him by a person dealing with him as the broker's representative. The salesperson practices under that broker's license and has no authority to hold client funds himself. Holding the money personally until the seller accepts delays the transfer the paragraph requires and leaves client money outside the account where LAC 46:LXVII Section 2717 says it belongs. Depositing it into the salesperson's own account is worse still, mixing a client's money with a licensee's own — the commingling R.S. 37:1455(A)(6) forbids. And endorsing the check over to the buyer's attorney routes it to a third party the salesperson had no authority to choose, when LAC 46:LXVII Section 2715 permits withdrawal from the account only on mutual written consent, a court order, a concursus deposit, or the other narrow grounds it lists.

If a dispute arises between a buyer and seller over who is entitled to escrowed deposit money, a Louisiana broker generally should:

• a.Transfer the funds to the broker's operating account for safekeeping
• b.Hold the funds in escrow pending written agreement or a court order✓
• c.Split the deposit equally between the parties without their consent
• d.Release the funds to whichever party contacts the broker first

LAC 46:LXVII §2901 tells the broker what to do when entitlement to escrowed funds is disputed, and none of it involves deciding the dispute: the broker sends written notice to all parties and licensees and then, within sixty days of the scheduled closing or of learning of the dispute, disburses on the written mutual consent of the parties, disburses on a court order, or places the money in the registry of a court through a concursus proceeding. Holding pending agreement or a court order is that rule stated shortly. Releasing the money to whichever party makes contact first turns a legal question into a race, and splitting it in half without consent is still the broker adjudicating, merely adjudicating in halves. Moving disputed funds into the operating account is the gravest of the three: R.S. 37:1455(A)(6) makes commingling a client's money with the broker's own a cause for suspension or revocation.

LAC 46:LXVII §2507 requires every printed advertisement for the sale or lease of residential real estate to show:

• a.The month and year the advertisement is printed or published✓
• b.The license number of the sponsoring or qualifying broker
• c.The assessed value of the property as shown on the parish roll
• d.The expiration date of the listing agreement being advertised

LAC 46:LXVII §2507(A) requires all printed advertisements for the sale or lease of residential real estate to indicate the month and year the advertisement is printed, published, or distributed, and treats a newspaper or trade publication bearing its own issue date as already compliant. The rule exists so a reader can tell how stale a price is. A license number is not what this rule commands, although §2505 separately requires that advertising be accurate and not misrepresent terms, value, or services. Assessed value is a tax-roll figure that has no fixed relation to market price and would mislead rather than inform. And the listing's expiration date is a term of the broker's contract with the seller under R.S. 37:1449(C); it is required in the agreement, not in the advertisement.

The last party signs a purchase agreement. Under R.S. 37:1449(B), the licensee must furnish every signer a copy bearing all signatures within:

• a.Twenty-four hours
• b.Ten business days
• c.Thirty days
• d.Five days✓

R.S. 37:1449 sets two different duties and it is worth keeping them apart. Subsection A requires that a principal signing any document be given a copy immediately after signing it. Subsection B then addresses documents that pertain to more than one party and requires each signer to receive a copy bearing the signatures of all parties within five days after the final signature is affixed. Twenty-four hours is the immediate-copy duty of Subsection A read into the wrong provision; a fully executed copy cannot always be produced that fast when signatures are gathered at different times and places. Ten business days and thirty days both exceed the statutory period, and delay here matters because the fully signed document is what fixes the deadlines the parties must then meet.

Under R.S. 37:1449(C), a Louisiana listing agreement or property management agreement must contain:

• a.A renewal clause operating unless the owner objects
• b.A broker's right to extend the term once
• c.A definite expiration date, free of qualifying terms✓
• d.A term of no more than six months

R.S. 37:1449(C) is a single sentence: written agreements for the sale or management of real estate shall specify a definite expiration date that shall not be subject to qualifying terms or conditions. Both halves do work. The date must be definite, so a listing that runs 'until sold' does not comply; and it must not be conditional, which is precisely what an automatic renewal is — a term that extends itself unless the owner takes action, leaving the owner bound by inaction. A unilateral right in the broker to extend fails the same test, since the ending date would then depend on the broker's later choice rather than being fixed when the owner signs. The statute sets no maximum length at all: a term longer than six months is lawful so long as its ending date is certain.

Under LAC 46:LXVII §3901, written offers and counteroffers for the purchase of real estate must be presented to the buyer or seller:

• a.Within forty-eight hours of the licensee receiving them
• b.Immediately, without delay✓
• c.After the sponsoring broker has reviewed and approved them
• d.At the next scheduled appointment with the client

LAC 46:LXVII §3901(A) requires all written offers and counteroffers to be presented to all buyers or sellers for their consideration and decision immediately, without delay; Subsections B and C add that the licensee must record the time of day and date the document was signed and the time and date it was accepted, rejected, or countered. Those timestamps are what make the immediacy rule enforceable. A forty-eight-hour allowance would legitimize exactly the delay the rule forbids, and delay is how a competing offer gets in front of a seller first. Making presentation wait on the sponsoring broker's review inserts a step the rule does not permit; supervision under §1801 operates through written policies, not by holding offers. And postponing to the next appointment lets the licensee's calendar decide when a client learns of an offer.

A broker has registered a business address with the commission and then opens a second office in another parish. Under R.S. 37:1444, that second office:

• a.May operate under the license already issued for the main office
• b.Must be registered with the clerk of court of the second parish
• c.Requires a separate branch office license✓
• d.Is allowed only if a second qualifying broker is designated for it

R.S. 37:1444 treats the address a broker registers with the commission as the place of business from which he conducts licensed activity, and then provides that if a broker conducts business from more than one place of business, a branch office license is required for each place maintained. The requirement follows the location rather than the person, which is why the main office license does not stretch to cover a second address. A parish clerk of court records instruments affecting immovables; it has no role in licensing an occupational premises. And the statute asks for a license for the office, not a second qualifying broker — one qualifying broker remains responsible for the firm, and LAC 46:LXVII §1801(E) confirms that where the broker is a business entity, the qualifying broker carries the supervisory duties.

R.S. 37:1449(D) requires a Louisiana broker to keep escrow bank statements, deposit slips, canceled checks, and transaction documents readily available and properly indexed for:

• a.Two years
• b.Three years
• c.Seven years
• d.Five years✓

R.S. 37:1449(D)(1) requires individual brokers to retain, readily available and properly indexed, bank statements, copies of deposit slips, and canceled checks on all escrow or trust accounts, together with copies of every document pertaining to transactions in which the broker or his sponsored licensees appeared in a licensing capacity — for a period of five years. Subsection E imposes the same period on corporate and partnership brokers. Two years and three years both fall short, and the shortfall matters because the retention period has to outlast the time in which claims and commission complaints can still surface. Seven years overstates what this statute requires. Five years is also the period LAC 46:LXVII §3703(D) sets for keeping a signed agency disclosure form, so the same figure governs the disclosure file.

A house in which a homicide occurred years ago is listed for sale. Under R.S. 37:1468, the fact of the homicide is:

• a.Not a material defect that must be disclosed in the transaction✓
• b.A material defect requiring written disclosure
• c.Disclosable only if the buyer asks about it
• d.Reportable to the commission before marketing

R.S. 37:1468(A) states that the fact or suspicion that a property is psychologically impacted — including that it was or was suspected to have been the site of a homicide, another felony, or a suicide, and including circumstances involving an occupant's HIV or AIDS status — is not a material fact or material defect regarding the condition of real estate that must be disclosed. Subsection B goes further and bars any cause of action against the owner or the agent for not disclosing it. That is why the written-disclosure choice is wrong even though it sounds cautious: the statute removes the event from the category of things the disclosure regime reaches. Making the duty depend on the buyer asking would reintroduce through the back door the very obligation Subsection A removes, and there is no reporting duty to the commission at all.

A licensee holding a listing buys the property for himself without telling the seller that he is the purchaser. Under R.S. 37:1455(A)(9), this is:

• a.Permissible so long as the licensee pays fair market value for it
• b.Acting as agent and undisclosed principal, a disciplinary cause✓
• c.Permissible if the licensee first resigns the listing agreement
• d.A violation only if the seller can prove an actual financial loss

R.S. 37:1455(A)(9) makes acting in the dual capacity of agent and undisclosed principal in any transaction a cause for censure, suspension, or revocation. The defect is the concealment, not the price, so paying full market value cures nothing — the seller was denied the knowledge he needed to judge his own agent's advice. The same paragraph shows what disclosure does: it carves out the licensee who is the seller or lessor of property he owns, or whose sole-proprietor real estate business owns it, provided the fact is disclosed to the buyer or tenant. Resigning the listing does not by itself fix matters either, since the information the licensee gathered as agent goes with him. And no proof of loss is needed; the violation is complete when the licensee occupies both roles undisclosed.

Under Louisiana's community property regime, property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is generally:

• a.Owned by the state until the marriage ends
• b.The separate property of the spouse whose name is on the title
• c.Community property owned equally by both spouses✓
• d.Automatically owned by the couple's children

Civil Code Article 2338 defines community property to include property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse, and Article 2340 supplies the presumption: things in the possession of a spouse during a regime of community of acquets and gains are presumed to be community, though either spouse may prove they are separate. Article 2336 states the ownership share — each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest. Putting the title in one spouse's name does not convert the asset, because Article 2341 defines separate property by how it was acquired, chiefly before the marriage or by inheritance or donation to that spouse individually, not by whose name appears on the act. The state acquires no interest in a couple's property by reason of their marriage. And children take through succession when a parent dies under Article 880, not during the marriage.

A tract of land carries a house, a fence, and standing timber, all belonging to the owner of the ground. Under Civil Code Article 463 these things are:

• a.Movables until they are separated from the ground
• b.Component parts of the tract, and therefore immovables✓
• c.Separate immovables owned apart from the land itself
• d.Incorporeal immovables, being rights rather than things

Civil Code Article 462 makes tracts of land, with their component parts, immovables, and Article 463 identifies those component parts: buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber, and unharvested crops or ungathered fruits of trees, when they belong to the owner of the ground. Ownership by the ground's owner is the condition, and Article 464 shows what happens when it fails — buildings and standing timber belonging to someone other than the owner of the ground are separate immovables, which is why that choice describes a different case rather than this one. Nothing here is a movable: Article 475 defines movables residually as everything the law does not consider immovable, and these things the law does. And Article 470 reserves 'incorporeal immovable' for rights such as servitudes and mineral rights, not for a house you can walk into.

In Louisiana, a usufruct of a house is:

• a.A real right of limited duration over another's property✓
• b.Ownership of the house subject to the grantor's right of repurchase
• c.A lease of the house for the lifetime of the occupant
• d.A security right over the house that secures payment of a debt

Civil Code Article 535 defines usufruct as a real right of limited duration on the property of another, and Article 539 spells out what the usufructuary of a nonconsumable such as a house may do: possess it and take the utility, profits, and advantages it produces, under the obligation of preserving its substance and using it as a prudent administrator. Ownership is not transferred — Article 478 calls what the owner retains the naked ownership — so describing it as ownership subject to a repurchase right misstates who owns what. It is not a lease either: a lease under Article 2668 is a contract for a term in exchange for rent, and it binds the lessor personally, whereas a usufruct is a real right that follows the thing. And Article 3278 reserves the security function for the mortgage, which is a nonpossessory right created to secure an obligation.

Compared with the right of use, the right of habitation under Civil Code Articles 630 to 638 is:

• a.Freely transferable and heritable, passing to the holder's heirs
• b.Available to corporations as well as to natural persons
• c.A right to collect the rents produced by another person's house
• d.Nontransferable and nonheritable, ending at the holder's death✓

Article 630 defines habitation as the nontransferable real right of a natural person to dwell in the house of another; Article 637 adds that the right is neither transferable nor heritable and may not be alienated, let, or encumbered; and Article 638 terminates it at the death of the person having it unless a shorter period is stipulated. The right of use is the deliberate contrast the outline draws: Article 641 allows it in favor of a natural person or a legal entity, Article 643 makes it transferable unless law or contract forbids, and Article 644 provides that it is not extinguished at the holder's death. So transferability, heritability, and availability to a corporation are all features of the right of use rather than of habitation. Nor is habitation a right to revenues: Article 634 entitles the holder to occupy the house and receive friends, guests, and boarders, which is a right to dwell, not to collect rent.

Under Civil Code Article 646, a predial servitude is:

• a.A charge imposed on a person for the benefit of a neighboring owner
• b.A right of a natural person to a specified use of another's estate
• c.A charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate✓
• d.A charge that one owner may impose on two estates that he owns

Article 646 defines the predial servitude as a charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate and adds the requirement that the two estates belong to different owners. Both halves are load-bearing. The charge runs estate to estate, not person to person, which is why the personal formulation is wrong: Article 650 makes the servitude inseparable from the dominant estate, so it passes with the land and continues to burden the servient estate when ownership changes. A right belonging to a person rather than to an estate is a personal servitude — Article 639's right of use is exactly that. And a charge between two estates in the same hand cannot be a predial servitude while the ownership is united; Article 741 treats that arrangement as destination of the owner, which ripens into a servitude only when the estates cease to belong to the same owner.

A subdivision's building restrictions forbid metal roofs. A lot owner installs one, openly, and nothing is done. Under Civil Code Article 781, an action for injunction or damages is barred after:

• a.Two years from the commencement of a noticeable violation✓
• b.Ten years from the recordation of the building restrictions
• c.One year from the sale of the offending property
• d.Five years from the day a neighbor discovers the violation

Civil Code Article 775 defines building restrictions as charges imposed by the owner of an immovable under a general plan governing building standards, uses, and improvements, and Article 781 supplies the deadline for enforcing them: no action for injunction or damages on account of a violation may be brought after two years from the commencement of a noticeable violation, after which the immovable is freed of the restriction that was violated. The article also defines noticeable — an apparent activity in violation, not the mere recordation of an instrument that provides for one. Ten years from recordation would run from the wrong event entirely, since the restrictions can sit unviolated for decades. One year from a sale ignores that the period runs from the violation, not from a transfer. And the period is not tied to a neighbor's discovery: apparent activity starts the clock whether or not anyone notices.

A married couple owns their home as community property. Under Civil Code Article 2347, selling, mortgaging, or leasing that home requires:

• a.The signature of whichever spouse is named on the act of acquisition
• b.The concurrence of both spouses✓
• c.Approval of the district court in the parish where it is located
• d.The concurrence of both spouses only if minor children live there

Article 2346 states the general rule that each spouse acting alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property, and Article 2347(A) then carves out the exceptions that matter most in a brokerage: the concurrence of both spouses is required for the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community immovables, of standing, cut, or fallen timber, of furniture or furnishings while located in the family home, of all or substantially all the assets of a community enterprise, and of movables registered in the spouses' joint names. Whose name appears on the act is not the test; Article 2340 presumes things possessed during the regime to be community whatever the act recites. No court approval is called for — Article 2329 requires a joint petition and a judicial finding only to modify or terminate the matrimonial regime itself. And the rule does not depend on children: it attaches to the character of the property.