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FICA splits the Social Security and Medicare tax down the middle: 26 U.S.C. §3101 imposes the employee's half, withheld from wages, and §3111 imposes a matching employer half. (a) and (d) are the two ways of believing one side carries it all - (a) is what a worker paid on a 1099 actually experiences, because a misclassified worker ends up paying both halves as self-employment tax. (c) inverts the rule: the self-employed pay both halves under SECA, 26 U.S.C. §1401, but employees and employers pay FICA too. This split is exactly what a contractor avoids by misclassifying a crew, and exactly what EDD assesses back.

A person who pays more than $100 in wages in a calendar quarter is an employer under Unemp. Ins. Code §675, and §1086 gives that employer 15 days to register with EDD. (a) treats registration as a year-end filing, confusing it with the annual reconciliation. (b) invents a large threshold; $100 in a quarter is a single day's pay for one laborer, so almost any hire crosses it. (d) is early rather than wrong in spirit, but it misstates the trigger - the duty is set off by paying wages, not by the start of work, which matters for an owner who works alongside a helper for a week before any cheque is written. Paying in cash changes nothing.

A compliant meal period under Labor Code §512 must be off duty: the employee is relieved of all duty, free to leave the premises, and free to use the time as they wish. Keeping the crew at their posts to answer questions converts the break into an on-duty meal period, lawful only where the nature of the work prevents relief and the employee has signed a revocable written on-duty agreement - and the premium under §226.7 is owed even though a full 30 minutes elapsed. (b) treats providing lunch as compliance; feeding the crew is not relieving them. (c) invents a 45-minute floor; the statutory period is 30 minutes. (d) confuses the on-duty meal period, which must be paid, with a compliant off-duty one, which is unpaid - paying for the time is a consequence of the violation, not a cure for it.

Labor Code §511 permits a properly adopted alternative workweek schedule (for example, four 10-hour days) after a secret-ballot election of at least two-thirds of affected employees and compliance with notice and DLSE filing rules. Under a valid 4/10 schedule, the regularly scheduled 10-hour days are paid at straight time; daily overtime kicks in only after the scheduled hours (over 10) and double time after 12. So a normal 10-hour day is all straight time.

Labor Code §204(a) requires wages to be paid at least twice during each calendar month on days designated in advance as regular paydays: work in the first half of the month is due by the 26th of that month, work in the second half by the 10th of the following month. (c) is the monthly-payroll belief, which §204 allows only for exempt executive, administrative and professional employees paid once a month by the 26th. (b) treats payday as discretionary; designating it in advance is the point of the section. (d) is the construction-specific error of tying wages to the owner's acceptance or to the contractor getting paid - earned wages run on the payroll calendar regardless of whether the job has funded.

Labor Code §221 makes it unlawful for an employer to collect or receive back any part of wages already paid, and §224 permits deductions only where they are authorized by law or by the employee's written authorization and do not reduce the wage below the statutory minimum. So even a genuine overpayment must be recovered by written consent or by suit, not by self-help. (a) is the 'it wasn't earned' framing, which fails because the money became wages when it was paid. (c) confuses disclosure with authorization - itemizing an unlawful deduction on the stub satisfies §226 and still violates §221. (d) is the belief that a payroll error entitles the employer to unilateral correction; no such exception exists.

Labor Code §351 makes a gratuity the sole property of the employee or employees to whom it is paid, and forbids the employer to take, collect, or deduct any part of it. (c) is the federal tip credit, allowed under the FLSA but not in California - a California employer owes the full state minimum wage under §1197 and the tips on top. (a) is the credit-card processing fee deduction, expressly barred by §351, which requires payment of the full tip by the next regular payday. (d) is the manager's cut; agents and supervisors with authority to hire or fire may not share in a tip pool, although a pool among employees who contribute to the service is lawful.

In Augustus v. ABM Security Services, the California Supreme Court held that employees must be relieved of all duties and employer control during rest periods, including being freed from the obligation to remain 'on call.' Requiring workers to keep radios on and respond defeats the off-duty nature of the break, making it non-compliant even if paid and even if no interruption actually occurs.

Reporting-time pay under Wage Order 16 §5(A) is half the usual or scheduled day's work when an employee reports and is given less than that, subject to a floor of two hours and a ceiling of four, at the regular rate. For a scheduled eight-hour day that is four hours. (b) is the intuition that you pay for time worked, which is exactly what the rule displaces. (a) reads the guarantee as the whole shift. (d) is the weather defense, and it is the closest of the three: Wage Order 16 §5(C) does excuse reporting-time pay when work is interrupted by an act of God or by a utility or civil authority - but the exception is narrow, and ordinary rain that merely makes roofing inconvenient does not reach it.

Labor Code §226.2(a) requires piece-rate employees to be separately compensated for rest and recovery periods and for other nonproductive time - time under the employer's control that does not generate piece-rate earnings, such as waiting for materials or moving between units - and to have both itemized on the wage statement. (c) is the averaging belief, that dividing total piece earnings by total hours proves the worker cleared minimum wage; §226.2 rejects averaging for these categories. (a) is the half-measure many payroll systems implement: rest breaks get a line, nonproductive time does not. (d) is the pre-2016 practice §226.2 was enacted to end.

Overtime is calculated on the 'regular rate of pay,' which includes not just the base hourly wage but also nondiscretionary bonuses, shift differentials, commissions, and certain incentive pay. Truly discretionary gifts, expense reimbursements, and employer health-premium contributions are generally excluded. Failing to fold a production bonus into the regular rate is a common overtime error that underpays workers.

Suastez held that vacation vests as it is earned, day by day, and Labor Code §227.3 requires all vested, unused vacation to be paid at the final rate on termination. (a) treats vacation as a discretionary gift; once offered, it is compensation for labor already performed. (c) is the mirror of (a) and is the most common error in a construction handbook - a use-it-or-lose-it forfeiture clause is void, although a reasonable accrual cap that simply stops further accrual is lawful. (b) confuses payout timing with vesting; accrued vacation is due on separation, not held to year-end. Unlimited or uncapped PTO plans, properly drafted, are a separate case in which nothing accrues to pay out.

Labor Code §227.3 requires that upon termination, all vested vacation be paid as wages at the employee's final rate of pay. There is no minimum-tenure requirement to trigger the payout, and it is paid at the final (not original) rate. Because it is treated as final wages, the timing rules of §201/§202 (and potential waiting-time penalties under §203) also apply.

Labor Code §226(e)(1) gives an employee who suffers injury from a knowing and intentional violation the greater of actual damages or $50 for the initial pay period and $100 for each later pay period, capped at $4,000 in the aggregate, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees. (d) uses the right per-period figure but drops both the initial-period step and the cap, and it is the number most often quoted second-hand. (b) imports a treble multiplier §226 does not contain. (c) is the belief that a stub is a courtesy; §226 is independently enforceable, and PAGA penalties can attach on top. Note the injury requirement - a technical omission with no injury does not by itself produce §226(e) damages.

The FLSA sets a floor, not a ceiling: 29 U.S.C. §218(a) expressly preserves any state standard more generous to the employee, so California's daily overtime, double time, and meal and rest premiums all apply on top of the federal 40-hour rule. (b) is the preemption error, and it is the one that costs money, because a multi-state contractor running federal-only payroll misses daily overtime entirely. (a) treats the two as a menu. (d) treats them as mutually exclusive and adds a waiver; Labor Code §219 makes wage protections non-waivable, so an employee could not give up the state standard even by agreement.

California measures hours worked by employer control, and Morillion held that time spent on employer-mandated transportation is compensable. Once the crew must report to the yard, load, and ride the company truck, they are under control and the travel is paid. (b) is the commute rule stated too broadly - an ordinary home-to-work drive in the worker's own vehicle is not paid, but that is because no control is exercised, not because travel is categorically exempt. (c) invents a duration threshold; control does not switch on at the second hour. (d) is the intuition that the outbound leg is the commute and the return is work; both legs are under the same control.

The line is between being engaged to wait and waiting to be engaged. A worker who must stay on site, cannot leave, and cannot use the interval for their own purposes is engaged to wait, and the time is hours worked. (a) borrows the rest-period label, but a rest period is both paid and duty-free; this interval is neither. (d) is the waiting-to-be-engaged case - genuinely released, free to go, told to come back when the inspector arrives - which is the same fact pattern with the control removed. (c) confuses compensability with rate: the time is paid, and whether any of it is overtime depends on the day's or week's totals under Labor Code §510.

Labor Code §98.6 makes it unlawful to discharge or discriminate against an employee for filing a claim with the Labor Commissioner, and §98.6(b) provides reinstatement, reimbursement for lost wages and benefits, and a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per employee per violation payable to the employee. (c) is the at-will defense, and it is the one employers actually raise: at-will termination is lawful for no reason, but not for a reason the Labor Code forbids. (d) imports a notice period California does not require of private employers at all - notice would not cure a retaliatory motive in any event. (a) confuses this with federal employment claims; §98.6 is enforced by the state Labor Commissioner or in state court.

Labor Code §2810.3 makes a client employer share with the labor contractor all civil legal responsibility for the payment of wages and for securing valid workers' compensation coverage for the supplied workers, and §2810.3(e) voids any attempt to shift that liability back by contract. (d) is the knowledge defense - the statute imposes shared responsibility without requiring the client employer to know of the specific violation. (c) is the whole point of the section: the supplied workers are not the client's direct employees, which is exactly why the Legislature had to create the liability. (a) invents a prospective-only limit. The real limits are elsewhere in §2810.3(a)(1)(B): the definition of client employer excludes businesses with a workforce of fewer than 25, and those using five or fewer supplied workers at a time.

Labor Code §2810.5(a) requires that a non-exempt employee receive, at the time of hire, a written notice stating the rate or rates of pay and the basis (hourly, piece, salary), any allowances claimed, the regular payday, the employer's legal name, address and phone, and the workers' compensation carrier - the DLSE Notice to Employee form. (c) is worse than unnecessary: Business & Professions Code §16600 makes non-competes void in California, and §16600.5 makes it unlawful even to ask an employee to sign one. (d) confuses the hire-time notice with the year-end W-2, which reports withholding after the fact rather than disclosing the rate in advance. (b) is nothing any employer owes an employee.

B&P §7125 conditions an active license on having workers' compensation coverage for a contractor with employees, and §7125.2 makes the suspension automatic by operation of law on the date coverage lapses, retroactive to that date - which also means work performed while suspended is unlicensed work under §7031. (b) confines the duty to public works; the requirement follows the employees, not the funding source. (c) confuses insurance with the §7071.6 contractor's bond, a separate instrument that does not move with payroll. (d) is the belief that workers' comp is purely a safety matter for Cal/OSHA. Note that §7125 still permits the no-employee exemption certificate, except for C-8, C-20, C-22, C-39 and D-49 licenses under §7125(b), where coverage is required regardless.

California employers must file the DE 9 (Quarterly Contribution Return and Report of Wages) and the DE 9C (which lists individual employee wages and withholdings) each calendar quarter with the EDD. These filings reconcile the UI, ETT, SDI, and personal income tax amounts. They are quarterly obligations, distinct from annual W-2s and from event-driven filings.

Labor Code §226(a) lists nine items a wage statement must show, including gross wages earned, total hours worked, all applicable hourly rates with the hours worked at each, all deductions, and net wages. A single lump sum shows none of them, and the violation stands even where the arithmetic underneath is right, because the section exists so the employee can check the arithmetic. (a) is that defense exactly, and it fails on the face of the statute. (d) inverts the exemption: §226(a)(2) excuses total hours for salaried EXEMPT employees, so the itemization duty bites hardest on the non-exempt worker, not on the salaried one. (c) is invented; the DLSE has no lump-sum format.

Labor Code §510(a) sets three daily tiers: the first 8 hours at straight time, hours 9 through 12 at one and one-half times, and anything past the 12th hour at double time. A 12.5-hour day is therefore 8 + 4 + 0.5. (a) is the belief that daily overtime has only one premium rate and that double time is a seventh-day rule - it misses the 12-hour line entirely. (d) starts double time after the 11th hour, a common off-by-one. (b) uses a triple-time rate that appears nowhere in California law; no Labor Code provision requires more than double the regular rate.

Labor Code §226.7 provides one additional hour of pay per workday for meal-period violations and a separate additional hour per workday for rest-period violations, so the daily maximum is two - the holding in United Parcel Service v. Superior Court. (c) is the single-premium reading, that §226.7 caps the day at one hour however many breaks were missed. (d) counts each individual break missed: an eight-hour shift owes one meal period and two rest periods, so this option pays per break rather than per category, which is the more tempting error of the two. (b) denies any premium; the premium is owed on top of wages for time actually worked, and the Supreme Court has held it is a wage, not a penalty.

Borello makes the hirer's right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result the single most significant factor; the rest - tools, skill, opportunity for profit or loss, permanence, method of payment - are secondary and none is decisive alone. (c) and (d) are two of those secondary factors promoted to first place, which is the characteristic Borello mistake: paying by the job and carrying your own general liability policy both point toward contractor status, but neither settles it. (a) is the labeling fallacy that fails under every California test. Note that it is the RIGHT to control that matters, not whether the hirer chooses to exercise it.

Labor Code §2781 routes a bona fide construction subcontract to the Borello test instead of the ABC test, but only where the sub holds a valid contractor's license from the CSLB, the agreement is in writing, the sub is customarily engaged in an independent business of the same nature, it has its own business location, it is free to hire and fire and to contract with others, and it maintains a business license or tax registration. (b) is half the rule and the half that proves nothing - a writing is required, but a writing alone is the label fallacy. (d) inverts the test: a sub with its own crew looks MORE independent, not less, and the section sets no head-count ceiling. (a) describes exactly the cash-payroll arrangement the statute was written to reach.

Labor Code §98.2(a) lets either party appeal the Labor Commissioner's Order, Decision, or Award to the superior court within 10 days after service, and the court tries the matter anew rather than reviewing the hearing record. (d) is the right instinct about a fresh hearing attached to the wrong forum: the Labor Commissioner is an administrative officer and empanels no jury - the jury, if any, comes with the superior court appeal. (b) sends the appeal to the licensing regulator, which has no jurisdiction over a wage award. (a) overstates finality. §98.2(c) is the trap for employers: an appealing party who is not successful in obtaining a more favourable judgment pays the other side's attorney's fees.

Labor Code §1174(d) requires payroll records showing the hours worked daily by and the wages paid to each employee, kept in English and in ink or other indelible form, and preserved for at least three years at the place of employment or a central California location, open to Labor Commissioner inspection. (c) and (d) each keep part of the record set and drop the part that decides a wage case - hours. (a) is the belief that a cash payroll has nothing to record, and it is the most expensive of the three: under §1174.5 the failure to keep the records is itself a $500 penalty, and missing records let the Labor Commissioner credit the employee's own account of the hours worked.

Labor Code §1197.1(a) adds a civil penalty of $100 per underpaid employee per pay period for an initial intentional violation and $250 for each later violation, plus restitution of the wages owed; Labor Code §1194.2(a) adds liquidated damages equal to the unpaid minimum wages on top. (d) is the make-whole intuition - pay the gap and the matter closes - and it understates the exposure by roughly a factor of three. (a) reads §1197.1's first-violation tier as a warning; the first intentional violation carries a penalty, not a caution. (b) would compound the violation: cutting future wages to recoup is itself unlawful under Labor Code §221 and could be retaliation under §98.6.

Labor Code §1194.2(a) awards liquidated damages equal to the unpaid minimum wages plus interest, which doubles the minimum-wage recovery; §1194.2(b) lets the court reduce or refuse them only where the employer shows it acted in good faith with reasonable grounds to believe it was complying. (a) denies the remedy exists. (b) substitutes an interest-like percentage, which is what liquidated damages sound like they should be. (c) invents a flat per-period figure, borrowing the shape of the §1197.1 civil penalty. Note the limit on the doubling: §1194.2 reaches unpaid MINIMUM wages, not unpaid overtime, so an overtime-only claim carries interest and fees under §1194 but not this doubling.

PAGA deputizes an aggrieved employee to sue for the civil penalties the Labor Commissioner could have assessed, on behalf of the state and other affected employees, with a share of any recovery going to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the rest to the employees. (a) inverts one of PAGA's real features: §2699.3 adds a notice-and-exhaustion step to the LWDA, so a PAGA plaintiff faces MORE procedure, not less. (c) confuses a civil penalty payable largely to the state with a personal damages multiplier. (d) is the belief that a worker's only route is an agency complaint; PAGA exists precisely because the agencies cannot reach every case.

Labor Code §500(a) defines a workday as any consecutive 24-hour period beginning at the same time each calendar day; the employer sets that starting time, and where none is set it defaults to midnight. Daily overtime under §510 is computed inside that fixed window, which is why a graveyard shift can straddle two workdays. (d) captures the employer's power to choose but drops the word that does the work - fixed. Moving the boundary week to week to break a long shift in half is precisely what the definition forbids. (a) confuses the 24-hour measuring period with hours worked inside it. (b) borrows a daylight definition California has never used for wages.

Labor Code §500(b) defines a workweek as any seven consecutive workdays, starting on the same calendar day each week - a fixed, regularly recurring block of 168 hours that the employer designates and may not shift to suit a payroll. (b) counts only the scheduled days; the week runs seven days whether or not anyone works them, which is what makes the seventh-consecutive-day rule in §510(a) measurable. (d) is the commonsense reading and is very often true in practice, but it is a default the employer may depart from, not the definition. (c) mistakes the usual schedule for the legal period. Weekly overtime over 40 hours is counted inside this defined week, not inside the pay period.

Ferra held that the 'regular rate of compensation' in §226.7(c) means the same thing as the 'regular rate of pay' used for overtime, so nondiscretionary bonuses, shift differentials and piece earnings are folded in before the premium hour is computed - and the holding applies retroactively. (d) is the pre-Ferra industry practice and the reason the case was brought; paying premiums at base rate alone underpays every worker who earns a production bonus. (c) substitutes a floor rate for the employee's own rate. (a) invents a fixed dollar premium, which would make the remedy identical for a laborer and a superintendent.

An on-duty meal period is lawful only where the nature of the work genuinely prevents the employee from being relieved of all duty - a lone watchman, a single operator who cannot leave a running process - and the employee has signed a written agreement revocable in writing at any time. (a) has it backwards: because the employee keeps working, an on-duty meal period must be PAID as hours worked, and an agreement to give up that pay would be void. (b) borrows a length-of-shift trigger from the second-meal-period rule. (d) substitutes posting for agreement; a notice on the gate is not the employee's consent, and consent here must be individual and revocable.

Labor Code §512(a) allows the first meal period to be waived by mutual consent only where the total work period for the day does not exceed six hours. (a) inverts the rule - the longer the shift, the less waivable the first meal period becomes, and past ten hours a SECOND meal period is owed, waivable only if the shift is no more than 12 hours and the first was taken. (d) treats the waiver as the employer's to declare; it takes the employee's agreement, and a standing blanket waiver signed at hire will not carry a day the worker actually exceeded six hours. (b) overcorrects into an absolute bar.

Labor Code §246(b)(1) sets accrual at no less than one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked, for any employee who works 30 or more days within a year for the same employer, with eligibility to use it after 90 days. An employer may instead front-load the full annual amount - 40 hours or five days since SB 616 took effect in 2024 - and skip accrual tracking. (a) and (d) both deny coverage: the Act applies to essentially every private employer in California regardless of size, which is what distinguishes it from FMLA-style thresholds. (c) borrows a vesting period from retirement benefits; sick leave begins accruing from day one of work.

Labor Code §246(i) requires the employer to show the amount of paid sick leave available - or paid time off provided in lieu of it - either on the itemized wage statement or in a separate writing given on the payday for each pay period. (a) treats it as an annual statement, which is how many payroll systems present PTO balances. (c) confuses it with the final-pay rules; note that unused paid sick leave, unlike vested vacation under §227.3, is NOT paid out at termination, which is a separate point worth keeping straight. (b) denies the duty entirely. The disclosure is per pay period, and it is one of the items a §226 wage-statement claim is commonly built on.

FUTA is imposed on the employer alone under 26 U.S.C. §3301 and may not be deducted from wages; an employer that pays its state unemployment contributions on time takes a credit under §3302 that drops the effective rate sharply. California's own UI contributions under Unemp. Ins. Code §976 are likewise employer-paid. (c) is the natural guess because unemployment benefits go to the worker, and because the neighboring SDI contribution IS withheld from the employee's wages - that contrast is the item to remember. (a) borrows the FICA split. (b) confuses unemployment tax with self-employment tax; the self-employed pay SECA and, having no employer, are generally not covered by unemployment insurance at all.

An employee's wages and withholdings go on Form W-2; a properly classified independent contractor gets Form 1099-NEC and handles their own taxes (c). The 1099-NEC is required once payments for services reach the annual threshold, which is $2,000 for tax year 2026 — the familiar $600 figure applied through tax year 2025. (a) is wrong because both are mandatory information returns. (b) and (d) each collapse the distinction: the form follows the worker's status, and issuing a 1099 does not by itself make someone a contractor. Classification still turns on the ABC test in Labor Code §2775 or, where an exception applies, on Borello.

The W-4 and the California DE 4 are withholding certificates: the employee states filing status and adjustments so the employer can compute federal and state income tax to withhold from each payment of wages. (a) is the DE 34 new-hire report, (c) is the Form I-9, and (b) happens through the employer's insurance policy, not through anything the employee signs at hire. All four documents are completed in the same onboarding session, which is why they blur together. Note that the DE 4 is separate from the W-4 because California allowances differ; an employee who files only a W-4 has California tax withheld at the default status.

An EIN, an LLC and a 1099 are paperwork; Labor Code §2775(b)(1) asks whether the work is outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business, and framing performed for a framing contractor is squarely inside it, so prong B fails no matter what entity signs the invoice. Close supervision defeats prong A as well. (a) is the entity fallacy. (d) is the tax-form fallacy - the 1099 records the payment, it does not characterize the relationship. (b) is the one that costs the contractor most to believe: Labor Code §226.8 penalizes the hiring party for willful misclassification, and §226.8(d) reaches a person who knowingly advised an employer to treat an employee as a contractor. The §2781 construction route would need a genuine licensed subcontractor running its own business, which this worker is not.

Labor Code §558(a) sets a civil penalty of $50 per underpaid employee per pay period for an initial violation and $100 for each subsequent violation, in each case plus an amount sufficient to recover the underpaid wages, which is paid to the affected employee. (d) is the right shape of consequence attached to the wrong statute - experience rating does move an employer's UI rate, but that is Unemp. Ins. Code §977, not §558, and it responds to benefit charges, not to wage violations. (a) understates the section to an advisory. (b) denies it force. Note that after ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) the underpaid-wages component of §558 cannot be recovered through a PAGA action; the flat penalties can.

Labor Code §1198 makes the maximum hours and the standard conditions of labor fixed by the Industrial Welfare Commission the legal limits, and employing anyone under conditions prohibited by the applicable order unlawful - the Wage Orders carry the force of law and are enforced through §1198, §558 and PAGA. (d) treats them as advisory, which is how they are often described because the IWC itself has been unfunded since 2004; the orders it issued remain fully in force. (b) inverts coverage: the orders protect non-exempt workers first, and salaried status is what can take a worker outside parts of them. (a) has it backwards - public entities are exempt from much of the Wage Order scheme, while private construction falls under Wage Order 16.

Labor Code §1102.5 protects employees who report suspected legal violations to a government agency (or internally) from retaliation. Demoting an employee for reporting payroll-tax evasion is unlawful whistleblower retaliation, exposing the employer to reinstatement, back pay, and civil penalties. It is neither lawful discretion nor a matter solely for tax authorities; the employee has protected-activity remedies.

SDI is withheld from the employee's wages and funds partial wage replacement for a non-work-related illness, injury or pregnancy, plus Paid Family Leave for bonding with a new child or caring for a seriously ill family member. (c) is the line that matters most on a jobsite: an injury that happens AT work goes to workers' compensation, which the employer pays for, not to SDI - a worker cannot draw both for the same injury. (b) is unemployment insurance, employer-funded under Unemp. Ins. Code §976 and payable to someone able and available to work, which is the opposite of the SDI claimant. (a) is unrelated to any EDD program.

Unemployment insurance is generally for workers who lose employment through no fault of their own, such as layoffs, lack of work, or reductions in force. An employee discharged for job-related misconduct (or who quits without good cause) may be disqualified from benefits. So misconduct-based termination is the scenario most likely to bar UI eligibility.

California rates UI contributions by experience under Unemp. Ins. Code §977: benefits charged to an employer's reserve account push its contribution rate up a schedule, so a contractor that lays off and rehires seasonally pays more per payroll dollar than one with a stable crew. That is also why it is worth contesting a claim the employer believes is not chargeable. (a) is the belief that unemployment tax is a flat cost of doing business. (c) and (d) both assume an employment-law consequence can move a statutory floor or ceiling; minimum wage and maximum hours are set by statute and Wage Order and do not flex with any employer's claims history.

Labor Code §226(a)(8) requires the wage statement to show the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer, so the worker can identify and, if necessary, sue the right party. A stub carrying only a DBA leaves an employee guessing which of several related entities employed them, which is the injury §226 is written to prevent. (c) overstates the rule: a trade name may appear, it simply cannot stand in place of the legal name and address. (a) invents a blanket ban on abbreviations. (b) is the practical-knowledge defense - the worker knows the yard, so where is the harm - and it fails because knowing the jobsite is not knowing the corporate defendant.