浏览所有题目

A bid is an offer to do the described work at the stated price; a contract forms only on acceptance. Until then the owner may reject it, it lapses after the time stated or a reasonable time, and it is generally revocable — though on public works a bid bond and Public Contract Code §5100 et seq. sharply limit withdrawal, and a general contractor's reasonable reliance on a subcontractor's bid can make that bid irrevocable under Drennan v. Star Paving (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409. (a) collapses offer into acceptance; opening a bid is not accepting it. (b) confuses a price proposal with a warranty — a fixed price allocates cost risk but warrants nothing about scope. (c) confuses the bid with the bid bond, which is the instrument that actually puts money behind a withdrawal.

Promissory estoppel substitutes detrimental reliance for bargained-for consideration: the promisor should reasonably expect the promise to induce action or forbearance, the promisee does justifiably and substantially rely, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. In construction the classic application is a general contractor's reliance on a subcontractor's bid — Drennan v. Star Paving (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409. Each distractor removes one required element: (b) drops foreseeability of reliance, so the promisor had no reason to guard his words; (c) drops reliance itself, leaving a bare gratuitous promise that no theory enforces; (a) drops the objective reasonableness that makes reliance justifiable.

Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409 is the California authority: a subcontractor who submits a bid knowing the general will use it in a prime bid should expect reliance, and once the general wins the job on the strength of that number the sub's offer becomes irrevocable for a reasonable time. No consideration was paid to hold the bid open; reliance takes its place. (a) inverts the parol evidence rule, which excludes outside evidence contradicting an integrated writing — it cannot make an offer binding. (c) treats the writing as the source of the obligation; the Statute of Frauds says which agreements need a writing, and a signed bid is still only an offer until accepted. (d) is a clause for events beyond a party's control; changing one's mind about a price is not such an event.

A retention or retainage clause lets the owner withhold part of each progress payment as security that the contractor will finish properly and correct defects, releasing it after satisfactory completion or acceptance (c). The percentage is no longer open-ended: Public Contract Code §7201 caps most public works at 5%, and Civil Code §8811 caps private works at 5% for contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2026, leaving the older 10% practice only for pre-2026 contracts and the statute's narrow exceptions. (a) is wrong because retention is money held back, not a claim on the contractor's property. (b) confuses retention with an administrative charge — retention is the contractor's own earned money, held temporarily, not a fee. (d) is wrong because the withheld money is paid when the conditions are met; a warranty period does not license the owner to keep deferring it.

A progress payment schedule provides for the contractor to be paid in installments as the work reaches defined milestones or percentages of completion, aligning payment with performance and helping fund ongoing costs. It avoids both full prepayment, which would over-expose the owner, and long-deferred payment, which would over-expose the contractor. It is a payment mechanism within the contract, not a substitute for having a written contract.

A contract or clause so grossly unfair and one-sided, formed under a serious imbalance of bargaining power, that it shocks the conscience may be declared unconscionable and refused enforcement, in whole or part. Unconscionability typically has both procedural (unfair bargaining process) and substantive (unfair terms) dimensions. It is unrelated to being 'liquidated,' 'integrated' (a completeness concept), or 'unilateral' (an acceptance-by-performance concept).

The scope of work fixes the boundary of what the contractor promised: inside it, the work is covered by the contract price; outside it, the work is a compensable extra. Every extras and change-order dispute is decided by reading it, which is why B&P §7159(d)(7) makes a description of the project and the significant materials a required term of a home improvement contract. (b) describes the project schedule, a different document — the scope says what, not when. (c) describes the changes clause, which sets the pricing mechanism once work outside the scope is ordered; the scope only tells you the work IS outside. (d) describes a differing-site-conditions clause; a bare scope statement allocates no risk.

When the signed agreement, the general conditions, the specifications and the drawings disagree — and on a real job they do — an order-of-precedence clause says which one wins, typically the agreement over the conditions over the specifications over the drawings, with addenda outranking what they amend. Without such a clause a court falls back on interpretation rules such as Civil Code §1651, under which specially written terms control over printed ones. (c) is the payment-priority misreading; the clause ranks DOCUMENTS, not people, and payment to subcontractors is governed by B&P §7108.5. (b) confuses it with a notice-of-claim or limitations provision. (a) confuses it with the rate schedule in a time-and-materials contract.

An indemnity shifts the financial consequence of a claim from one party to another — the subcontractor agrees that if a third party sues the general over the sub's work, the sub carries it. California regulates construction indemnity heavily: Civil Code §2782 makes void any clause purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability arising from the promisee's OWN sole negligence or wilful misconduct, or for defects in design it furnished, and §2782.05 further limits Type I indemnity in most private construction subcontracts. (b) confuses indemnity with a time extension; indemnity moves money, not schedule. (c) and (d) describe giving away the work or the payment, which no indemnity does — the clause allocates the risk of THIRD-PARTY claims, not the parties' own exchange.

A severability clause states that if a court finds one provision invalid or unenforceable, that provision is severed and the remaining valid provisions continue in full effect, preserving as much of the parties' bargain as possible. It prevents a single defective clause from destroying the whole agreement. It does not void the entire contract, resurrect the invalid provision, or automatically cut the price; it isolates the unenforceable term.

California follows the American rule: Code of Civil Procedure §1021 leaves each side to bear its own attorney's fees unless a contract or a statute says otherwise, so (a) describes the DEFAULT the clause exists to displace. Civil Code §1717 then does something drafters often do not expect — it makes any contractual fee clause reciprocal, so a clause written to protect one side alone still entitles whichever party prevails to recover, which is why (b) is wrong even when the contract says exactly that. (d) invents a cap; 'reasonable' is fixed by the court on the work actually done. Some fee entitlements come from statute rather than contract: B&P §7108.5(c) gives fees to the prevailing party in an action for wrongfully withheld subcontractor payments.

A later writing signed by both parties that moves the completion date and adds $6,000 of scope is a modification of the existing contract, supported by fresh consideration on both sides — new work for new money (Civil Code §1698(a)). (d) is the usual error on this item: the parol evidence rule (Code Civ. Proc. §1856) excludes PRIOR or contemporaneous agreements that would contradict an integrated writing; it says nothing about an agreement made afterwards. (c) reaches for novation, which under Civil Code §1530 requires the parties to intend to extinguish the old obligation and substitute a new one; adding scope leaves the original contract standing. (b) calls a signed writing oral.

A time-and-materials contract prices the work by inputs, so an invoice is worth exactly what the record behind it is worth: dated daily logs of who worked and for how many hours at which agreed rate, what material arrived, and the supplier invoices proving it. B&P §7159.10(e)(7) shows the same logic in statute for a service-and-repair job estimated on time and materials — the contract must disclose the set rate, the estimated cost of materials, and how time is computed, in quarter hours, half hours or hours. (a) is irrelevant to proving work done; liquidated damages fix the consequence of a breach in advance. (d) proves a precondition to suing at all under B&P §7031, not the amount owed. (b) documents attendance, not hours, rates, or materials.

A clear, integrated scope of work sets the boundary of the fixed price; a task outside it is an extra, and it becomes compensable when the owner orders it. On home improvement work that order must be a change order in writing, signed before the changed work begins (B&P §7159(d)), and §7159(e)(3) requires the contract to warn the buyer that extras without such an order are unenforceable against him. (a) is the owner's version of the argument, and it proves too much: if a fixed price covered anything anyone later wanted, the scope clause would mean nothing. (b) misapplies the Statute of Frauds, which decides which agreements need a writing at all (Civil Code §1624), not whether an integrated contract can be added to. (d) blames the contractor for not pricing work nobody asked him to price.

Signing the wrong person costs the contractor twice. The contract binds only the party who signed, so a tenant, a property manager or one co-owner acting alone can leave the contractor with no claim against the person who owns the property — and the mechanics lien is no rescue, because Civil Code §8444 lets an owner who did not contract for the work record a signed and verified notice of nonresponsibility and take the fee interest out of reach. For a home improvement contract, B&P §7159(d) requires the writing to be signed by the parties to the contract, so who signs is a compliance question as well as a collection one. (b) is backwards: less certainty about who is bound makes a written scope more necessary, not less. (c) and (d) are invented — public works status turns on public funds and a public awarding body, and no signature sets a price.

Every dispute about extras is really a dispute about what the scope said and whether the change was authorised, and the contractor is the party who loses when neither was written down. On home improvement work this is not merely best practice but the law: B&P §7159(d) requires the contract and any change to it to be in writing and signed before the covered work begins, and §7159(e)(3) makes the contract warn the buyer that an extra without such an order is unenforceable against him. (d) is the argument that vagueness leaves room to negotiate; in practice it leaves room for the owner to say the work was always included. (c) removes the one term §7159(d)(5) makes mandatory. (b) works right up until the money is disputed, which is the only moment the question is asked.

在加州，仲裁条款本身是合法的。第 7191 条管的是呈现方式：在四个住宅单元以下的住宅物业合同中，该条款必须以「ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES」为醒目标题，印刷合同中须用至少 10 磅的罗马体粗体，并在法定告知之后单独签名缩写。不符合这些要求的条款并非一概作废——第 (c) 款的效果是：它不得对持照人「以外」的任何人强制执行，也就是说承包商自己仍然受其约束。

第 2782(a) 条规定，建筑合同中凡是要求就受偿方「单独」过失或故意不当行为所生责任予以赔偿的条款，均违反公共政策，无效且不可强制执行。当事人同意救不了它，保险也救不了它：无论双方怎么写、背后有什么承保，该条都直接使条款失效。它也不限于人身伤害——该条同时列举了死亡、人身伤害、财产损害以及其他损失。

保证最高价的机制是：在上限以内按成本报销，到上限为止；超过上限的部分全部由承包商承担。因此 36,000 美元的超支归承包商，业主付 400,000 美元。这正是保证最高价与普通成本加酬金的区别——后者由业主报销工程实际消耗的全部成本。它同样区别于总价包干合同，因为在上限以下业主支付的仍然是实际成本，而不是一个约定的固定价。

加州现行工资法适用于金额超过1,000美元的公共工程合同；第1771条本身对1,000美元及以下的公共工程项目作了除外。在这条线之上，唯一的进一步减免是有条件的：依第1771.5(a)条，经工业关系部主任批准实施劳工合规计划的招标机构，可以对建造类不超过25,000美元、或改建、拆除、修理、维护类不超过15,000美元的项目，选择不要求支付现行工资。这两个数字另外还是第1771.1(n)条下DIR注册的界线。

《劳工法》第1770条和第1773条规定，由劳工关系部（DIR）部长按工种和地区确定现行工资标准，应付的是施工时有效的那一档标准。承包商即使取得机构同意也无权自行确定。授予合同的机构必须在招标文件中声明适用现行工资，但它只是照录部长的决定，而非自行拟定。市议会决定的是预算，不是工资标准。

《劳工法》第1725.5条要求每年向劳工关系部（DIR）注册，并且在投标、被列入投标名单、获得合同或施工时注册都必须处于有效状态。CSLB 只负责签发执照，并不设公共工程注册库，该选项凭空造出了一个制度。建筑主管部门负责许可与检查，与工资合规无关。美国劳工部管的是联邦资助工程的戴维斯－培根法，不是加州的注册。

《劳工法》第1776条要求把认证工资单提交给劳工专员；在受 DIR 监督的工程上，第1771.4(a)(3)条还要求以电子方式、至少每30天提交一次。CSLB 只收执照续期费，从不接触工资单。国税局收到的是雇佣税申报，报的是汇总数字，不是逐个工人的项目记录。公共工程的「业主」就是公共机构，它依第1776(b)条以招标机构身份取得记录，而不是以业主身份审核进度款。

现行工资由基本时薪加上雇主支付的附加福利（如医疗保健、养老金和培训）构成。总额必须达到DIR的标准。

《民法》第9550条要求金额超过25,000美元的公共工程合同的直接承包商在开工前提供付款保证金，第9554(a)条要求由获准承保的保险人出具；其存在的原因正是分包商和供应商无法对公共财产主张留置权。机械师留置权是私人工程的救济手段，在公共工程上根本无法成立。CSLB 执照保证金是面向受害方的25,000美元保证金，不会因公共工程而加倍。B&P 第7071.8条的纪律保证金是执照恢复的条件，与公共工程合同无关。

由于公共财产不能被留置，公共工程项目中未获付款的索赔人向公共机构送达停付通知，机构随后必须扣留足够的项目资金来支付该索赔。

《劳工法》第1777.5条要求承包商依第8编第230条用 DAS-140 表格把中标情况通知经批准的学徒委员会、申请派遣学徒工，并按规定比例雇用。是否工会会员无关紧要，派遣学徒工的是项目而非工会。学徒工按其培训阶段对应的学徒工资率领取，绝不是熟练工的双倍。也不存在居住地要求：工资率按县确定，但工人不必住在该县。

《劳工法》第1775(a)条要求承包商补足工资差额，并按每名工人每个日历日最高200美元加收民事罚款，由劳工专员评定、授予合同的机构依第1726条扣款。法条中没有「只给警告」这一档处理。工人无权放弃现行工资标准，所以「工人同意」不构成抗辩。吊销执照是 CSLB 另行处理的程序，可能在转介后发生，但从不自动发生。

《劳工法》§1773.2 把义务分成两半：发包机构在招标公告中载明工资标准，而「承包商」则要把适用的工资裁定张贴在每一个工地上、张贴在班组看得见的地方，好让工人能查到自己工种的工资率。选项(b)错的正是这个分工：发包机构自己存一份，只履行了发包机构的义务，工人面前什么都没有。总部办公室之所以不行，理由相同——工人不在那里。而张贴是强制性的，所以最后一个选项说的与规则正好相反。

《劳工法》第1720(a)(1)条以资金来源界定公共工程：依合同进行、全部或部分由公共资金支付的建造、改建、拆除、安装或维修。业主自家翻新不涉及公共资金。单看造价不能决定性质，因此造价超过25,000美元的商业建筑若无公共资金就不在定义之内。土地归属也不是标准：在市属土地上私人出资建的公寓楼不是公共工程，而私人所有但获得公共补贴的建筑却可能是。

履约保证金以公共机构为受益人，保证工程按合同完成；承包商违约时由保险人安排续建或赔偿损失。《民法》第9550条要求开工前交付的付款保证金保护的是分包商和供应商，因为他们无法对公共财产主张留置权。CSLB 执照保证金是取得执照的条件，面向一般受害方，与本合同无关。投标保证金只保证中标人会签约并交付其余保证金。

《劳工法》第1725.5条把 DIR 公共工程注册设为每年注册、每年缴费，并要求在投标、被列名、中标或施工时都处于有效状态。一次性注册会使年费无从收取。CSLB 执照按自己的两年周期续期，两者的续期互不相干。注册附着于承包商而非具体工程，因此无需逐个项目重新办理。

《劳工法》第1772条把在公共工程上做工的每一名工人都视为受雇于该工程，第1774条则要求承包商和每一家分包商都不得低于现行工资标准支付。是否工会会员无关紧要，因为工资率按工种和县确定。最低工资是所有雇佣的底线，与谁应得现行工资无关。把义务限于总承包商自己的工人正是第1774条要堵住的漏洞，因为公共工程的大部分劳务都由分包完成。

《劳工法》第1777.5(g)条和第8编第230.1条要求同工种中每5小时熟练工工作至少配1小时学徒工工作，并按整个项目期间累计计算，而不是逐班核算；除非该工种经批准的标准另定比例。一比一把义务翻了一倍，一比十把义务减了一半。「整个项目配1名学徒工」根本不是比例：要求随实际发生的熟练工工时同步增加。

《劳工法》第1811条把公共工程的一个工作日定为8小时，第1815条要求每日超过8小时或每周超过40小时的工时，至少按基本小时现行工资率的1.5倍支付。对全部工时都只付平时工资，正是第1815条禁止的违法行为，还会触发第1813条每名工人每日25美元的罚没。等到满40小时才算加班忽略了「按日」这个触发点：即便这一周很短，周一的第9小时也是加班。双倍工资不是第1815条规定的费率。

《劳工法》第1813条规定，工人在某一日历日被要求或允许工作超过法定最长工时而未获得规定加班费的，每名工人每天罚没25美元。该罚款是在补付所欠加班费之外另行收取的。

机械师留置权之所以有效，是因为可以通过强制拍卖该不动产来清偿债务；而供公共使用的土地无法这样变卖，留置权也就无所附着，于是立法者用《民法》第9550条的付款保证金和停付通知取而代之。留置权在私人工程上依然有效，因此第一项根本不成立。在私人工程上，享有留置权的不只是直接承包商，分包商和供应商同样享有。也不存在按金额禁止留置的规则：25,000美元只是公共工程必须提供付款保证金的门槛。

投标保证金保护公共机构，防止中标人事后撂挑子：它保证中标人会签订合同并提供付款保证金和履约保证金，若中标人反悔，保险人承担改判给次低标者所增加的费用。向工人和供应商付款是《民法》第9550条付款保证金的职责。是否符合规范靠检查和履约保证金的竣工承诺来保障，与投标保证金无关。CSLB 执照保证金是取得执照的条件，不会被任何工程保证金取代。

《劳工法》第1777.1条规定，被取消资格的承包商及其持有权益的任何企业，在一至三年的确定期限内不得投标、获得公共工程合同或作为分包商施工；期限届满后资格即恢复。CSLB 执照是另一回事，不会因取消资格而被吊销，更不会永久吊销。三倍赔偿不是现行工资的救济方式；第1775条加收的是按人按日的罚款外加工资差额。加州的取消资格针对州和地方公共工程，联邦层面的排除是另一套联邦程序。

《劳工法》第1776条要求认证工资单可供查阅，但提供给公众的副本必须涂去个人识别信息——例如每名工人的姓名、地址和社会安全号码——以保护工人隐私。

按《劳工法》第1773.1条，现行工资是一个整体：基本小时工资加上雇主为福利支付的款项。若雇主没有做出合格的福利缴款，就必须把这些福利的金额折算成现金，作为额外工资付给工人，使总额达到工资决定的标准。不理会附加福利部分等于每小时都少付，构成第1775条的违法。拖到工程结束再补也不行，因为该义务附着于每个计薪期，而不是竣工结算。也不存在可申报的豁免：是否适用取决于工种分类和实际从事的工作。

答案是工伤赔偿保险，它跟着雇员走，而不是跟着项目类型走：劳工法典 §3700 要求每一位雇主投保，B&P §7125(a) 则规定，持有有效的《工伤赔偿保险证明》或由工业关系厅厅长签发的《自保证明》，是核发、恢复、启用、续期或继续维持执照的先决条件。在 2028 年 1 月 1 日之前，§7125(b) 允许没有雇员的持照人改为提交豁免声明——但持有 C-8、C-20、C-22、C-39 或 D-49 类别的持照人除外，他们无论有无雇员都必须投保；自 2028 年 1 月 1 日起，经 SB 1455（2024 年第 485 章）推迟生效的 SB 216 版本要求每一名持照人投保，唯一例外是依 §7029 组成且没有雇员的联营体。因此公共机构不能把合同授予应投保而保险已失效的承包商——因为 §7125.2 规定保险一断，执照本身即被中止。另外三个选项都是真实的保单，但针对的是别的风险：产权保险承保土地权属上的瑕疵，建筑工程一切险承保在建工程本身的物理损失，关键人物人寿保险则在所有者或管理者身故时赔付给企业。它们都不会赔给受伤的工人。

《劳工法》第1777.7(a)条规定，每一个完整日历日的不合规最高可罚100美元；三年内明知而第二次违规的，每日最高300美元；第1777.1(d)(1)条则允许劳工专员在最长一年内（再犯时最长三年）取消其投标或施工的资格。合同价款不会被没收，授予合同的机构只扣下已评定的金额。这是民事处罚制度，不是刑事制度。而且比例是强制性的：第1777.5条要求提出派遣申请并达到比例，只能通过经批准项目的程序获得减免。

《民法》第9356条只设两个期限：竣工、验收或停工通知登记后30天内；若未登记任何此类通知，则为竣工或停工后90天内。登记通知会缩短期限，绝不会让90天那一支继续适用，这正是第二项的陷阱所在。等到正式验收可能已经错过期限，而验收本身就是启动30天时钟的事件之一。也不存在没有期限的权利：期限一过，公共机构就没有扣款义务；第9558条另行规定，停付通知期届满后六个月，付款保证金之诉即告截止。

《民法》第9554(a)条要求付款保证金必须由获准承保的担保保险人出具，即由保险监理官发照、可在本州经营担保业务的公司，这样机构才能核验担保人的偿付能力。银行可以开具信用证，但那不是保证金，不满足第9554条。保险代理人只是销售保证金，并不承担背后的责任，代理人的个人责任也不是法条认可的担保。而授予合同的机构是保证金所保护的一方，自然不能同时充当担保人。

《劳工法》第1773条由部长按工种和地区确定工资率，工人应得的是施工当时有效的那份工资决定；正因如此，带有到期日的决定可能在工程进行中把工资率抬高。投标日对报价有意义，但不会冻结应付的工资。工资率按地区确定，别的县公布的费率与本工程无关。机构的预算数字对任何人都没有约束力：确定义务的是工资决定，不是预算估算。

劳工法 §1773.3 要求授标机构在授予任何公共工程合同后 5 天内向 DIR 提交单独通知（通常为 PWC-100），提供用于认证工资单报告的项目识别号。

劳工法 §1813 规定，在公共工程中要求或允许工人超时工作但未按规定支付加班费，每名工人每违规历日须缴纳 25 美元罚款。

劳工法 §1777.7 授权对 3 年内明知故犯地第二次违反学徒制标准的行为，除民事罚款外，最长可禁止投标或获得公共工程合同 3 年。

根据民事法 §9356 和 §9558，除直接承包商以外的索赔人必须在公共工程完工、验收或停工通知备案后 30 天内送达停止付款通知；若未备案此类通知，则期限延长至实际完工或停工后 90 天。