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A private-work payment bond adds a surety to pursue; it does not by itself extinguish lien rights, and a claimant may hold both remedies while recovering the debt only once. The real qualification is Civil Code §8600: where the owner in good faith files the direct contract with the county recorder and records a payment bond of at least 50 percent of the contract price before work commences, the court shall, where equitable, restrict lien enforcement to the bond. (a) states that outcome as though it were automatic, which it is not. (b) is double recovery, which no remedy permits. (d) misreads who may claim on the bond: §8608 gives the right to claimants who provided work to the direct contractor, directly or through subcontractors.

A recorded notice of cessation has the same effect as a notice of completion: Civil Code §8414 cuts claimants other than the direct contractor to 30 days after recording, and §8412 gives the direct contractor 60 days. (b) swaps the two figures, and reversing them is the most common error on this pair. (c) is the rule when nothing is recorded — 90 days after completion for everyone — and is exactly what the recording is meant to shorten. (d) confuses this with the §8460 outer limit for bringing a foreclosure action after a lien is recorded.

Completed operations responds to bodily injury and property damage arising out of the contractor's work after that work is finished and turned over — the coverage that answers latent defects surfacing years later. (a) is workers' compensation and employers' liability, a different policy entirely. (b) is business income coverage, a first-party time-element loss. (d) is the hardest distractor and the most valuable to get right: the CGL's business-risk exclusions generally leave the cost of repairing your own faulty work uninsured, even though the resulting damage to other property may be covered.

Until January 1, 2028, B&P §7125(b) as amended by SB 1455 (Stats. 2024, ch. 485) lets a licensee with no employees skip the policy by filing a statement, on the Registrar's form, certifying that it employs no one subject to the workers' compensation laws — provided it holds no C-8, C-20, C-22, C-39 or D-49 classification. A Class B sole owner with no employees qualifies (b). (a) is the rule SB 216 wrote: from January 1, 2028 only a §7029 joint venture with no employees will be exempt and this sole owner will have to carry coverage. SB 1455 moved that date from 2026, so material that calls it current is out of date. (c) inverts the list: adding a C-39 roofing classification is exactly what takes the exemption away. (d) is misclassification, not exemption: Labor Code §2750.5 presumes a worker performing licensable work is an employee, and paying on a 1099 changes the paperwork rather than the status.

Civil Code §8460 requires an action to enforce a lien within 90 days after recording, unless a notice of credit is recorded extending the time — and in no event may the action be brought more than one year after recording. (a) transfers the claim without touching the deadline; an assignee inherits the same clock. (c) confuses the amount with the time limit, and inflating a lien invites the §8422 overstatement problem. (d) imports a debt-acknowledgement rule from the statute of limitations, which does not restart the mechanics lien deadline.

If a subcontractor has no workers' compensation coverage, its injured workers can be treated as employees of the hiring contractor, whose own policy then pays and whose experience rating carries the loss. Requiring each sub to insure its own people keeps that exposure where it belongs. (a) overstates the licensing rule: under B&P §7125(b) a licensee with no employees may still file an exemption unless it holds one of the excluded classifications. (c) is false — a contractor's policy covers its own construction employees. (d) mixes workers' compensation with the lien statute, which says nothing about it.

Civil Code §8532 makes the bond the price of forcing a lender, a stranger to the dispute, to freeze loan funds: if the claim turns out to be bad, the bond answers the lender's resulting damages and costs. (a) confuses it with the §7071.6 license bond, which is a licensing condition unrelated to any project. (c) reverses the beneficiary — the bond protects the lender against the claimant, not the claimant against the borrower. (d) is the misconception that a bond can cure a missed notice; it cannot, and a claimant who never noticed the lender has nothing to serve.

On a performance bond, the obligee is the party protected by the guarantee of completion — typically the project owner. The contractor is the principal and the bonding company is the surety. Subs and suppliers are protected instead by the payment bond.

Civil Code §8416 requires the claimant to serve the owner or reputed owner with a copy of the lien and the statutory Notice of Mechanics Lien, and to record a proof of service affidavit with the lien; failure makes the lien unenforceable. (b) borrows the 20-day preliminary notice rule, which is a different notice served before the lien exists. (c) conflates service with the §8460 deadline for filing suit. (d) treats a recording condition as an evidentiary detail, which is precisely the mistake §8416 was written to punish.

Civil Code §2782 voids a construction contract clause purporting to indemnify a party for its own sole negligence or willful misconduct, and §2782.05 further restricts indemnity by subcontractors for the active negligence of the general contractor. (b) inverts the statutes, which reach residential work rather than exempting it. (c) is the pre-statute common-law position, which clear drafting no longer rescues. (d) is a real and important distinction stated as an equivalence — additional insured coverage is subject to policy terms and limits, and does not do the work of an indemnity clause.

Civil Code §2782(a) makes void and unenforceable, as against public policy, a construction contract provision purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability for death or bodily injury, injury to property, or any other loss arising from the promisee's own sole negligence or willful misconduct, or from defects in design furnished by the promisee. §2782.05 goes further inside subcontracts, voiding a subcontractor's indemnity of the general contractor for the general contractor's active negligence, subject to the exceptions the section lists. (a), (b) and (d) are ordinary commercial risks that parties remain free to allocate by contract — which is why the item turns on fault, not on inconvenience.

Primary and noncontributory means the subcontractor's policy answers first for claims arising out of the subcontractor's work, and does not ask the additional insured's own insurer to share the loss — which is what makes the risk transfer real rather than nominal. (c) is the excess or umbrella position, the exact inverse of what the requirement buys. (a) describes where the general contractor stands with no additional insured endorsement at all. (d) is workers' compensation, a coverage no liability endorsement supplies.

When no notice of completion or cessation is recorded, Civil Code §8412 and §8414 give every claimant 90 days after actual completion to record a mechanics lien. The 30/60-day distinctions apply only once such a notice is recorded.

A payment bond gives unpaid subcontractors and suppliers a solvent source other than the owner's real property, which reduces the owner's exposure to liens and to paying twice for the same work. (b) describes the performance bond, which answers non-completion — the two bonds are issued together and protect against different failures. (c) misunderstands surety pricing: the premium is earned, and in any case it is a cost the contractor carries into the contract price. (d) is unrelated, since retention is governed by the contract and by Civil Code §8811.

Contractor's inland marine — the equipment floater and installation floater — covers movable property while it travels and while it sits at a jobsite, which ordinary fixed-location property policies will not follow. (a) is the owner's permanent property insurance, which takes over where builder's risk ends. (b) is workers' compensation; the tools are incidental to who was hurt. (c) is commercial general liability. The common thread among the wrong answers is that each is a real policy a contractor carries, which is what makes placing the loss the skill being tested.

Civil Code §8400(d) gives an equipment lessor a lien right, but §8410 makes enforcement depend on having given the preliminary notice, and §8200 sends that notice to the owner, the direct contractor, and the construction lender, no later than 20 days after first furnishing under §8204(a). (a) is the automatic-lien belief: the right exists and is unenforceable without the notice. (b) serves only the party upstream, which is the most common fatal error — the lessor has no contract with the owner, so the owner is exactly who must be told. (d) records too early: §8414 allows the claim of lien only after the claimant ceases to provide work, and before the earlier of 90 days after completion or 30 days after a recorded notice of completion.

A certificate is a verification document: it lets a hiring party confirm, before work starts, that the other side carries the coverages and limits the contract demands. (a) requires an additional insured endorsement, and the certificate only reports one if it exists. (b) reads the cancellation-notice box as an enforceable promise, when most modern forms expressly disclaim it. (d) describes what the underlying insurance requirement and indemnity clause are meant to accomplish — the certificate merely evidences that the machinery is in place.

Labor Code §3600 provides benefits without regard to fault for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and §3602 makes those benefits the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer — the bargain at the centre of the system. (b) and (c) describe the tort regime workers' compensation replaced, where the worker had to prove negligence and litigate fault. (d) imports contributory negligence, which is exactly what the no-fault rule abolishes; an employee's ordinary carelessness does not forfeit benefits.

An umbrella or excess policy sits above scheduled underlying policies — commercial general liability, commercial auto, often employers' liability — and pays only after those limits are exhausted, which is how a contractor reaches catastrophic-claim limits without buying them at the primary layer. (c) inverts that structure. (a) confuses liability limits with workers' compensation, which is statutory, separate, and not something an umbrella replaces. (d) names the risk the CGL's 'your work' exclusion leaves with the contractor, and an umbrella follows the underlying policy's terms rather than curing its exclusions.

Civil Code §8416(a) requires a written statement, signed and verified by the claimant, containing the claimant's demand after deducting all just credits and offsets, the name of the owner or reputed owner if known, a general statement of the kind of work furnished, the name of the person who employed the claimant, a description of the site sufficient for identification, the claimant's address, and a proof of service affidavit; the statutory Notice of Mechanics Lien must be served with it. §8422 forgives erroneous information about the demand, the credits, the work, or the site unless the court finds the claimant intended to defraud, or a party without actual knowledge was misled to its prejudice. The other three answers are records no lien requires and that do nothing to identify the claim.

A contractor's own commercial general liability policy insures it against covered third-party bodily injury and property damage arising from its operations, whether or not anyone has named it on another policy. (a) and (c) reverse the direction of additional insured coverage — that status usually runs upward, giving the owner and prime access to the sub's insurer, not the other way round. (b) confuses the two coverages: workers' compensation answers injuries to the contractor's own employees, and third parties are not employees.

Notice to the lender is what keeps the fund-based remedy alive: a bonded stop payment notice under §8532 obliges the lender to withhold loan money it has not yet disbursed. (b) is the closest trap because lien priority is a real and valuable question, but priority turns on when work commenced relative to recording of the deed of trust, not on whom the preliminary notice went to. (c) reverses the point of the notice, which is to stop money rather than release it. (d) invents a claim against the lender's own insurance.

Public property cannot be sold to satisfy a private claim, so the legislature substituted two remedies: the direct contractor's payment bond and a stop payment notice served on the public entity against funds still unpaid. (d) is the sharpest distractor, because both bonds are posted on the same job — but the performance bond answers to the public entity for completion, and a sub is not its beneficiary. (a) concerns work ordered by someone other than the owner. (b) is first-party property insurance on the work itself and pays no one for unpaid labour or materials.

Recording a release bond under Civil Code §8424 substitutes the bond for the property, so the claimant's action runs against the surety and the principal rather than against title. (d) is the step the bond was recorded to foreclose, and pursuing it is the error the section exists to prevent. (a) misroutes a claim: the §7071.6 licence bond is claimed against its surety, and the CSLB holds no money. (c) reaches the wrong party — funds in the lender's hands are the target of a bonded stop payment notice, a separate remedy with its own notice conditions.

Coverage B of a workers' compensation policy answers employee-injury liability that the no-fault benefit system does not resolve — third-party-over actions, consequential claims by family members, and dual-capacity claims. (a) is Coverage A of the same policy, the statutory benefits themselves, and mistaking the two is the whole point of the item. (c) is commercial general liability, which excludes injury to employees precisely because this coverage handles it. (d) is a wage claim, which is neither an injury nor insured under a workers' compensation policy.

With no notice of completion or cessation recorded, Civil Code §8412 gives the direct contractor 90 days from completion to record. Counting 90 days from March 1 lands near the end of May.

Checking the certificate before the sub mobilizes verifies that the required coverage exists at the moment exposure begins, when it is still possible to keep an uninsured sub off the site. (a) confuses receiving a document with buying a policy. (b) reads the certificate as controlling the insurer, which it does not — cancellation rights live in the policy. (c) reverses the transfer: the purpose is to reach the sub's insurer for the sub's work, not to spend the general contractor's own limits on it.

The two bonds are issued together and answer different failures: the payment bond guarantees that subcontractors and suppliers are paid, and the performance bond guarantees to the owner that the work is completed according to the contract. (a) invents schedule and budget guarantees neither bond gives. (c) is half-right and therefore the strongest distractor — reduced lien exposure is a real benefit to the owner, but it is a consequence of subs being paid, and no bond exists to protect the surety. (d) reverses both beneficiaries.

Civil Code §8416(a)(5) requires a description of the site sufficient for identification; a street address usually does, and a legal description removes all doubt. §8422 then forgives an erroneous site description unless the court finds the claimant intended to defraud, or that a party without actual knowledge of the mistake was misled to its prejudice. (a) and (b) appear nowhere in the section. (d) is close enough to be tempting — §8416(a)(2) requires the owner's name if known and (a)(6) requires the CLAIMANT's address — but the owner's mailing address and phone number are not what identifies the property.

An additional insured endorsement lets the owner or general contractor tender a claim arising out of the subcontractor's work to the subcontractor's insurer and obtain a defense and indemnity under that policy, subject to its terms and limits. (a) is the dangerous reading: risk transfer supplements your own coverage and never excuses it. (b) confuses insurance with cost allocation — adding insureds does not reduce the premium. (c) describes a performance bond, which is a surety obligation rather than an insurance one.

Civil Code §8400(f) lists the design professional among the persons with a mechanics lien right for work provided to a work of improvement, subject to the same preliminary notice condition in §8410 and the recording deadlines in §8412 and §8414. California also gives design professionals a separate remedy in §8300 et seq. for design services furnished before construction starts, which §8302(c) allows only where a building permit or other governmental approval has been obtained using those services. (a) ignores both routes. (b) reverses the remedies, and a design professional's stop payment notice rights are expressly preserved in §8608(b). (c) confuses property insurance with a payment remedy.

Only the insurer can add an insured to a policy, and it does so by endorsement; a certificate is a broker's evidence of coverage and its own wording disclaims amending the policy. (d) is the substitute owners most often settle for — a notice provision tells the owner when coverage is ending, it does not make the owner an insured or give it a right to defense. (a) and (b) belong to other transactions entirely, one in the lien law and the other in a credit file.

A stop payment notice is served, not recorded; it directs the owner or lender to withhold funds. A mechanics lien, by contrast, is recorded against the property. Both require a valid underlying claim by someone who furnished work and proper service.

Labor Code §2775(b)(1) treats a worker as an employee unless the hiring entity proves all three parts of the ABC test, and §2781 sets the narrower conditions for construction subcontractors; the label on the paperwork settles nothing. An employer that owed coverage and had none faces the civil action §3706 allows, in which §3708 presumes the injury was caused by the employer's negligence and removes the usual defenses, plus §3700.5 misdemeanor exposure and suspension of the license under B&P §7125.2. (a) understates the exposure by orders of magnitude. (b) is the label-as-conclusion error the ABC test forecloses. (d) misreads the commercial general liability policy, which excludes bodily injury to the insured's own employees precisely because workers' compensation answers it.

Civil Code §8204(a) provides that a claimant who did not give preliminary notice is not precluded from giving one later, but is then entitled to claim only for work performed within the 20 days prior to service of the notice, and at any time thereafter. Service on Day 40 therefore protects deliveries from roughly Day 20 forward, and the deliveries from Day 1 to Day 19 fall outside the window. (b) treats a late notice as fatal, which the subdivision expressly says it is not. (c) ignores the look-back altogether. (a) counts 20 days forward from service instead of backward, which protects nothing the statute protects.

A mechanics lien ultimately requires a foreclosure action against the owner's real property to collect, making it more cumbersome than a stop payment notice (reaching funds) or a payment bond claim (reaching a surety). Claimants often pursue funds or bonds first.

Civil Code §8414 gives a claimant other than the direct contractor 30 days after a recorded notice of completion; miss it and the lien remedy is gone, though a payment bond claim, a timely stop payment notice, or a plain breach-of-contract action may remain. (a) borrows the direct contractor's 60-day period under §8412, which is not available to lower-tier claimants. (c) is the no-notice rule the recording displaced. (d) states the §8460 deadline for suing on a lien already recorded, which never revives a lien that was recorded too late.

A commercial general liability policy excludes bodily injury to an employee arising out of employment, because that injury belongs to workers' compensation, with Coverage B employers' liability picking up the suits the no-fault system does not resolve. (a), (b) and (c) are exactly what the CGL is bought for: third-party bodily injury and property damage arising out of the contractor's operations. The line is who was hurt, not how badly or where — an employee framing the same wall as the injured visitor produces a workers' compensation claim, not a CGL claim.

Under Civil Code §8600 et seq. the right to recover on a private-work payment bond tracks the notice conditions for a mechanics lien, so a claimant who had to give a preliminary notice must have given it — laborers and others excused from notice are excused here too. (a) imports the §8532 bond that accompanies a stop payment notice to a lender. (c) treats the remedies as sequential when they are alternative; a claimant may go against the bond without ever recording. (d) would make the bond useless, since its value is being payable without first litigating to judgment.

Insurance transfers the insured's own fortuitous losses to an insurer that does not expect repayment; a bond is a three-party guarantee running to an obligee, and the surety expects the principal to reimburse what it pays. Projects carry both because the risks do not overlap. (a) and (b) each describe insurance and then attach the label to both instruments. (c) mistakes who a bond protects — the owner is typically the obligee the bond runs to, so the bond protects the owner from the contractor, not the reverse.

A claimant that has been paid should execute and record a release, and an unreleased lien clouds the owner's title until it does. The owner's statutory remedy is the petition in Civil Code §8480: once the claimant has let the 90 days in §8460 pass without commencing an action to enforce the lien, the owner may petition for an order releasing the property, the claimant carries the burden of proving the lien's validity under §8488(a), and §8488(c) awards the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees. §8494 then strips an expired lien of any effect as notice. (a) ignores the practical problem the statute addresses, since the cloud on title bites long before anything expires. (b) invents a treble-damages penalty this remedy does not carry. (d) names the wrong party's loss: the harm runs to the owner whose title is clouded, not to the contractor.

$25,000 is the contractor's bond every active licensee must keep on file under B&P §7071.6 — and the same figure is the minimum disciplinary bond under §7071.8 and the amount of the qualifying individual's bond under §7071.9. (b) is the real neighbor and the reason this item is worth asking: Civil Code §9550(a) requires a payment bond on a public works contract involving an expenditure in excess of $25,000, the identical number doing an unrelated job. (a) invents a statutory cap on liens; a lien is in the amount of the claimant's demand. (d) invents a CSLB insurance requirement — the only insurance the license law compels is workers' compensation under §7125, plus the limited liability company's liability policy under §7071.19.

SB 216 (Stats. 2022, ch. 978) wrote a version of §7125 that requires every licensee to carry workers' compensation or self-insurance whatever its classification, leaving only a §7029 joint venture with no employees exempt, and set it to start on January 1, 2026. SB 1455 (Stats. 2024, ch. 485) rewrote that start date: the new section "shall become operative on January 1, 2028" (b), and the interim §7125 — a no-employee exemption available to everyone except C-8, C-20, C-22, C-39 and D-49 holders — stays in effect until then. (a) is the original SB 216 date, which is why so much study material still states the all-licensee rule as current. (c) is a real date in the same bill, but for something else: by January 1, 2027 §7125.7 requires the board to establish a process to verify that licensees claiming the no-employee exemption are eligible. (d) is not a date either bill uses.

Until January 1, 2028, B&P §7125(b), as amended by SB 1455 (Stats. 2024, ch. 485), exempts an applicant or licensee that has no employees and files the Registrar's exemption statement — but only if it does not hold a C-8 (concrete), C-20 (warm-air heating, ventilating and air-conditioning), C-22 (asbestos abatement), C-39 (roofing) or D-49 (tree service) license. A C-33 painter is not on that list, so (c) may file. (a), (b) and (d) are on it: those holders must carry workers' compensation or a certification of self-insurance whether or not they employ anyone, and CSLB will not accept an exemption from them. From January 1, 2028 the list stops mattering, because the SB 216 version of §7125 requires every licensee to carry coverage except a §7029 joint venture with no employees — the painter included.

第 3722 条在两个不同的触发点上分两次征收。第 (a) 款随停工令一并作出，发生在任何人受伤之前，按签发并送达停工令时在雇人数每人 1,500 美元计。随后，第 (d)(2) 款在工伤被认定应予赔付时，按受伤之日在雇人数每人再加 10,000 美元。第 (f) 款的 100,000 美元是这些罚款「总额的上限」，本身不是一项罚款；而第 3700.5 条的刑事责任还叠加在这一切之上。

这是同一笔交易的两个半边。第 3600(a) 条规定雇主的赔偿责任「不问过失」，因此受伤工人即便部分甚至全部出于自身疏忽，仍可获得赔付。第 3602(a) 条则是这笔交易的对价：工伤赔偿请求是针对雇主的「唯一且排他」的救济，因此那起过失诉讼不能成立。狭窄的例外规定在别处——雇主故意殴打、欺诈性隐瞒伤情、雇主自制并出售的缺陷产品，或者雇主根本未投保。

两个期限从两个不同的事件起算。雇主自知悉工伤起有一个工作日交付索赔表。工人「递交」该表后，第 5402(c) 条要求雇主在一个工作日内授权符合适用诊疗指南的全部治疗，因此周三递交意味着周四之前。在索赔被接受或拒绝之前，这部分治疗责任以 10,000 美元为限——这笔钱正是在结论作出之前先花出去的，这就是该条的用意。90 天是另一个期限：未被拒绝的索赔到那时即被推定为应予赔付。

《民法典》第 8302 条为设计专业人员在「计划中的工程尚未开工」的情况下，仍在场地上设定留置权——该章存在的意义正在于此。本题的条件全部齐备：符合第 8014 条定义的人员（注册专业工程师）、与土地所有人之间的书面合同、为推进该工程而取得的建筑许可或其他政府批准，以及登记留置权主张时订约的土地所有人仍持有该地块。若当初未取得许可，则依该章根本不产生留置权。