Explorar todas las preguntas

Los dos remedios persiguen bienes distintos. El gravamen mecánico del §8400 se adhiere al inmueble mismo, por el importe que fija el §8430(a) — el menor entre el valor razonable del trabajo y el precio acordado — y se ejecuta mediante una acción entablada dentro de 90 días del registro conforme al §8460(a). El aviso de suspensión de pago va tras el dinero: el §8520(a) permite al reclamante con derecho de gravamen distinto del contratista directo darlo al propietario, el §8530 permite darlo al prestamista de construcción, y el §8500 hace de este capítulo la vía exclusiva hacia el fondo de construcción, de modo que nadie puede invocar otro derecho legal o equitativo sobre ese fondo salvo por contrato escrito con quien lo tiene. (a) lo dice todo al revés e inventa un gravamen contra una licencia, que no existe en ninguna forma. (b) ignora que difieren los plazos además de los objetivos: el §8412 y el §8414 rigen el registro de un gravamen y no dicen nada del aviso. (d) inventa una sustitución: el pago acaba con los dos remedios y ninguno se convierte en el otro.

El §8416(a) enumera lo que debe contener una reclamación de gravamen mecánico, y cada punto se refiere a la reclamación misma: una declaración de la demanda del reclamante tras descontar todos los créditos y compensaciones justas, el nombre del propietario o supuesto propietario si se conoce, una declaración general del tipo de trabajo prestado, el nombre de quien empleó al reclamante o a quien este prestó el trabajo, una descripción del sitio suficiente para identificarlo, la dirección del reclamante, una declaración jurada de prueba de entrega completada, y el NOTICE OF MECHANICS LIEN en tipografía negrita de al menos 10 puntos, todo firmado y verificado por el reclamante. Nada de ello pide los datos del préstamo del propietario, así que (a) es inventado; nada pide los números de licencia de otros subcontratistas, y eso es (b); y el contrato es prueba y no requisito del gravamen, y eso es (c). El §8410 es la condición aparte que hace caer a los reclamantes: el gravamen es ejecutable solo si se dio el aviso preliminar y se probó.

El §8416(e) lo dice sin rodeos: no entregar la copia de la reclamación de gravamen mecánico como prescribe la sección, incluido el Notice of Mechanics Lien que exige el §8416(a)(8), hace la reclamación inejecutable por ministerio de ley. Registrar es solo la mitad del trabajo, y ahí yerra (a). El §8416(c) explica cómo se entrega — correo registrado, certificado o de primera clase con certificado de envío, dirigido al propietario o supuesto propietario en su domicilio o lugar de negocios, o en la dirección que muestre el permiso de construcción, o como disponga el §8174 — y si el propietario no puede ser notificado así, la copia puede ir al prestamista de construcción o al contratista original. El §8416(d) hace completa la entrega al depositarse el correo, y por eso la declaración jurada de prueba de entrega que exige el §8416(a)(7) figura en el propio gravamen. (c) y (d) inventan conversiones que ninguna sección prevé: el aviso de suspensión de pago es un remedio aparte que el reclamante debe dar por sí mismo, y una sentencia monetaria solo la dicta un tribunal.

Los avisos de detención de pago en proyectos privados deben entregarse dentro de los mismos plazos externos aplicables a los gravámenes mecánicos: generalmente dentro de los 90 días posteriores a la finalización o cese de la obra de mejora si no se registra un Aviso de Finalización o de Cese. Registrar tal aviso acorta estos plazos.

El Civil Code §8200 exige que todo reclamante salvo el contratista directo y los jornaleros notifique al propietario, al contratista directo y al prestamista de construcción a más tardar 20 días después de suministrar por primera vez trabajo, servicios, equipo o materiales; el §8204 permite el aviso tardío pero limita el reclamo a los 20 días previos y posteriores. (a) omite a los dos destinatarios cuya falta cuesta más: sin el prestamista no hay aviso de suspensión de pago con fianza. (c) invierte la secuencia. (d) usa 90 días, que es el plazo del §8412 para registrar el gravamen, no para el aviso preliminar.

Conforme al Civil Code §8412, un contratista directo debe registrar su gravamen mecánico dentro de 90 días después de la finalización de la obra de mejora. Si el propietario registra un aviso de finalización o cesación bajo §8182, la ventana del contratista directo se acorta a 60 días después de ese registro (§8412), y la ventana del subcontratista/reclamante se acorta a 30 días. El plazo de 90 días aplica cuando no se registra NOC. Una ventana de 1 año confunde el registro del gravamen con el plazo de la §8460 para ejecutar un gravamen registrado (90 días para presentar demanda).

El Civil Code §8460 requiere que un reclamante inicie una acción para ejecutar un gravamen mecánico registrado dentro de 90 días después de registrado el gravamen; de lo contrario el gravamen expira y se vuelve inejecutable. El reclamante y el propietario pueden extender el plazo por acuerdo escrito bajo §8460(b), pero solo hasta un año desde la finalización. La opción de 180 días no existe. Las opciones de 1 año desde la adjudicación y el estatuto de 4 años confunden las limitaciones de incumplimiento de contrato escrito con el plazo mucho más corto del gravamen mecánico. Perder esta ventana de 90 días es una de las formas más comunes en que los subcontratistas pierden derechos de gravamen.

El §3700 exige a todo patrón de California asegurar el pago de la compensación, y admite exactamente dos vías: una póliza de una aseguradora autorizada a emitir compensación de trabajadores en este estado, o un certificado de consentimiento para autoasegurarse expedido por el Director de Relaciones Industriales. Incumplirlo es delito menor bajo el §3700.5, y el dinero pesa: el §3722(a) impone $1,500 por empleado en el momento en que se emite una orden de paro, y el §3722(b) impone el mayor entre el doble de la prima que el patrón debió pagar y esos mismos $1,500 por empleado durante el periodo sin seguro. Del lado de la licencia, el B&P §7125 exige al licenciatario con empleados tener un certificado vigente en archivo (hasta el 1 de enero de 2028 el que no tiene empleados puede presentar una exención salvo que tenga una clasificación C-8, C-20, C-22, C-39 o D-49; desde esa fecha solo queda exenta la empresa conjunta del §7029 sin empleados), y el §7125.2 suspende la licencia por ministerio de ley desde la fecha en que debía haber cobertura. (b) es un formulario tributario, (c) es el seguro que el §7071.19 exige aparte a una LLC, y (d) es ley federal con umbral de 50 empleados.

La empresa conjunta del §7029 sin empleados puede mantener hoy una exención, y desde el 1 de enero de 2028 —cuando entre en vigor la versión del §7125 de la SB 216, aplazada desde 2026 por la SB 1455— será el ÚNICO titular que pueda hacerlo; hasta entonces, otros titulares sin empleados fuera de las clasificaciones C-8, C-20, C-22, C-39 y D-49 también pueden presentarla. El §7125.4 anula esa exención por ministerio de ley en el momento en que se contrata a un empleado, y la licencia queda suspendida salvo que conste un Certificado de Seguro de Compensación al Trabajador. No hay periodo de gracia para buscar póliza (d), ni se espera a la renovación (c), ni hay que renunciar a la licencia (b).

El plazo de 20 días del Civil Code §8200 corre desde que el reclamante SUMINISTRA POR PRIMERA VEZ mano de obra, servicios, equipo o materiales — aquí el 1 de julio, de modo que notificar alrededor del 21 de julio protege todo el reclamo; el §8204 permite un aviso posterior pero limita la recuperación a los 20 días previos y posteriores. (b) ata el plazo al papeleo y no a la entrega, el error más común y costoso de los proveedores. (c) usa una fecha de registro que atañe a la prioridad del gravamen. (d) toma prestado un aviso de inicio de otros estados; California usa terminación y cesación.

El Civil Code §9358 obliga a la entidad pública notificada a retener, de lo que aún debe del contrato, una suma suficiente para responder al reclamo más una asignación razonable de costas, y queda protegida si retiene de buena fe. (a) omite la sentencia que un acreedor necesita antes de embargar una cuenta. (b) pide un remedio que el aviso no otorga: el contrato sigue, solo se detiene el dinero. (c) es la trampa que todo el esquema de obra pública responde: la propiedad pública no puede gravarse, por eso el legislador sustituyó este aviso y la fianza de pago del §9550.

El §8424(b) fija el bono en 125 por ciento del reclamo del gravamen —o del monto que el reclamo asigna a la propiedad que se libera— y exige que lo emita una aseguradora de fianzas admitida. Al registrarse, el bien inmueble queda liberado del gravamen y de toda acción para ejecutarlo, y ese margen del 25 por ciento existe para cubrir los intereses y costos que el reclamante pueda recuperar. Quien registra el bono debe notificar al reclamante y adjuntar una copia, y el reclamante tiene entonces seis meses desde esa notificación para demandar sobre el bono, un plazo distinto de los 90 días que el §8460 concede para demandar sobre el gravamen mismo. Así (d) se queda 25 puntos corto, (b) inventa un descuento por gravamen disputado, y (a) se equivoca dos veces: no se exige efectivo y la fianza es precisamente lo que pide la sección.

El B&P §7071.11(a) es explícito: si la fianza no alcanza para pagar todos los reclamos en su totalidad, su suma se distribuye entre todos los reclamantes en proporción al monto de sus respectivos reclamos. La misma subdivisión limita la responsabilidad agregada de la afianzadora por salarios y beneficios a $4,000, así que el carpintero no puede obtener más de eso de la fianza. (a) es la creencia extendida de que la fianza es un fondo con prioridad para el consumidor: el §7071.5 sí enumera a los propietarios entre los beneficiarios, pero ser beneficiario no es tener prioridad. (c) aplica una regla de primero en el tiempo que la sección no usa. (d) es la más tentadora, porque la sección sí singulariza los salarios — pero los limita, no los prioriza.

El Civil Code §2782.05 anula o limita las cláusulas que exigen que un subcontratista, o su aseguradora, asegure o indemnice a un contratista general o propietario por la negligencia activa de este último, de modo que el endoso responde por la responsabilidad derivada del trabajo del sub y su cuota de culpa, y la aseguradora del sub igual debe defender esos reclamos. (a) exagera la norma: el endoso se limita, no se elimina. (b) es justamente la obligación que el §2782.05 suprime. (d) es creer que el endoso es una cobertura general; no lo es, y la póliza del prime responde por su propia negligencia.

Civil Code §8400 gives a lien right to a person that provides work authorized for a work of improvement, and lists the direct contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, equipment lessor, laborer, and design professional; §8404 defines authorized work as work requested or agreed to by the owner, or authorized by a direct contractor, subcontractor, architect, project manager, or other person having charge of part of the work. The framing subcontractor is squarely inside that. (b) is the limit that matters: a creditor who contributed nothing to the improvement, such as the contractor's landlord or lender, has no lien. (a) and (c) shrink the class to a single tier, which would leave every subcontractor and supplier without the remedy the chapter was written for.

Civil Code §8412 gives a direct contractor 90 days after completion of the work of improvement to record a mechanics lien when no notice of completion or cessation has been recorded. The shorter deadlines apply only after such a notice is recorded.

Under Civil Code §8414, once a notice of completion (or cessation) is recorded, a claimant other than the direct contractor must record its lien within 30 days. The direct contractor gets 60 days after that notice. Absent any such notice, everyone has 90 days after completion.

Civil Code §8414 gives the direct contractor 60 days after recording of a notice of completion or cessation, while all other claimants get 30 days. If no such notice is recorded, all claimants have 90 days from completion under §8412.

Civil Code §8204(a) says a claimant who did not give preliminary notice is not precluded from giving one later, but is then entitled to record a lien, give a stop payment notice, or claim against a payment bond only for work performed within the 20 days before service, and at any time afterwards. (a) is the harshest misreading — late notice costs the early work, not the remedy. (c) is the mildest, and it ignores the look-back altogether. (b) invents a doubling of the period; nothing in the section extends the 20 days, which is why the practical rule is to serve at the start of every job.

Civil Code §8200 requires a claimant without a direct contract with the owner to serve the preliminary notice on the owner or reputed owner, the direct contractor, and the construction lender if there is one; §8204 makes the notice reach back only 20 days, so late service shortens what can be claimed. (b) omits the owner, whose property the lien attaches to. (c) omits the lender, and that omission specifically costs the claimant the bonded stop payment notice against undisbursed loan funds. (d) confuses the preliminary notice with recording — the preliminary notice is served, not recorded, and serving only the party upstream of you is the most common fatal error.

Civil Code §8200(e)(1) excuses a laborer from giving preliminary notice, and §8200(e)(2) excuses a claimant with a direct contractual relationship with the owner from notifying anyone but the construction lender. §8024 defines laborer as a person who, acting as an employee, performs labor on or bestows skill on a work of improvement, and extends the term to a fund owed part of that compensation. (a), (b) and (c) all lack an owner contract, so each must serve the owner, the direct contractor, and the lender within the §8204(a) 20 days — and an equipment lessor is the one people most often assume is exempt, when §8400(d) gives it a lien right on exactly the same conditions as anyone else.

Civil Code §8200(e) excuses a direct contractor from serving the owner — the contract itself gives the owner notice — but the direct contractor must still give the preliminary notice to a construction lender to preserve rights against the construction funds. (a) inverts the flow: notice runs up the chain toward the people who control the money, not down it. (b) applies the general rule without reading the exception, and is the trap for anyone who memorised '20 days' alone. (c) over-reads the exception, which covers only the owner and not the lender.

Once paid, the claimant records a release of the mechanics lien, and that recorded release is what clears the lien from title. An owner who cannot obtain one has two statutory routes: record a lien release bond of 125 percent of the claim under §8424, which shifts the claimant's remedy from the land to the bond, or, once the claimant's 90 days under §8460 have run without an action, petition for a release order under §8480. (b) is a completion event under §8180(a)(4), which starts deadlines rather than ending a lien. (c) is the §8444 notice an owner who did not contract for the work posts and records within 10 days of learning of it. (d) is the §8200 notice served at the outset to preserve lien rights.

Civil Code §8460 requires the claimant to commence an action to foreclose the mechanics lien within 90 days after recording. If no suit is filed in time (absent a recorded extension), the lien expires and is unenforceable.

A stop payment notice under Civil Code §8500 et seq. directs the owner, or a bonded notice directs the construction lender, to withhold money not yet paid out and hold it against the claim; §8534 sets the owner's duty to withhold. (a) confuses two securities — a claim on the §7071.6 license bond is made against the surety, not through a stop payment notice. (b) describes the mechanics lien, which attaches to the property itself; the point of the stop payment notice is that it reaches the money instead. (c) assumes a levy right that only a judgment creditor has.

Civil Code §8532 obligates a construction lender to withhold only on a bonded stop payment notice, accompanied by a surety bond of 125 percent of the claim; the bond protects the lender if the claim turns out to be bad. (a) is the closest trap: form and verification matter, but no amount of formality substitutes for the bond. (b) reverses the order — the notice works without going to court, which is why it is useful. (c) borrows mechanics lien practice, where recording is the operative act; a stop payment notice is served, not recorded. A notice to the owner under §8534 needs no bond.

A payment bond guarantees payment down the chain: §8608 gives the right of recovery to claimants who provided work to the direct contractor, directly or through one or more subcontractors, and §8612 conditions the claim on the preliminary notice the lien law requires. (a) and (b) both describe a performance bond, which answers to the owner for completion and quality — the two bonds are usually bought together and confusing them is the classic error. (c) is not a bonded obligation at all; financing costs are the owner's own.

Labor Code §3700 requires every employer to secure the payment of compensation, by insurance or by a certificate of consent to self-insure, and one employee triggers it; B&P §7125 then makes a current certificate of workers' compensation insurance or of self-insurance on file with the board a condition of the license itself. A licensee with NO employees may file an exemption statement instead until January 1, 2028, unless it holds a C-8, C-20, C-22, C-39 or D-49 classification; from that date SB 216, as postponed by SB 1455 (Stats. 2024, ch. 485), requires coverage of every licensee except a §7029 joint venture that employs nobody. General liability, commercial auto, and builder's risk are routinely required by contract, by a lender, or by the Vehicle Code for the vehicles themselves, but none of them is made mandatory for contractors by the license law, and none of them pays an injured worker's benefits.

B&P §7125(b), as amended by SB 1455 (Stats. 2024, ch. 485), lets a licensee with no employees file an exemption statement instead of carrying coverage — but only if it does not hold a C-8, C-20, C-22, C-39 or D-49 classification. A roofer is on that list, so the C-39 holder must carry workers' compensation or a certification of self-insurance even with nobody on the payroll (d). (b) is the rule for a painter or a Class B contractor with no employees, and it is the trap here: the classification is what decides it. The list stops mattering on January 1, 2028, when the SB 216 version of §7125 becomes operative and every licensee must carry coverage except a §7029 joint venture with no employees — the roofer's answer is the same either way. (a) and (c) name real policies that cover other risks: general liability answers to third parties, builder's risk to property damage during construction, and neither substitutes for workers' compensation.

Commercial general liability answers for bodily injury and property damage suffered by third parties and arising out of the contractor's operations or completed work, together with the duty to defend those claims. (a) is business income coverage, and a liability policy insures what the contractor owes others rather than what the contractor failed to earn. (b) is workers' compensation, which the CGL expressly excludes. (c) is first-party property coverage — inland marine or a tools floater. Note too the 'your work' exclusion: the CGL does not pay to redo the contractor's own defective workmanship.

Builder's risk is property insurance on the structure and the materials while the project is under way, against perils such as fire, theft, vandalism, and wind; it insures the work itself, and it ends when the project is finished. (b) is the owner's permanent property and liability program, which takes over at occupancy. (c) is commercial general liability, which answers for third-party bodily injury and property damage. (d) is workers' compensation. The line to hold is property coverage on the work versus liability coverage for harm to others.

A certificate of insurance is an informational snapshot: it says that a described policy was in force when the certificate was issued, and it neither amends the policy nor creates rights. (a) is the single most expensive misconception in construction risk transfer — additional insured status comes from an endorsement to the policy, and the certificate merely reports it. (b) reads the 'cancellation notice' box as a promise; most modern certificates disclaim any duty to notify. (c) mistakes the summary for the contract; only the policy and its endorsements grant coverage.

Additional insured status extends the subcontractor's coverage to the prime for liability arising out of the subcontractor's operations, so the sub's insurer may owe the prime a defense and indemnity for those claims. (b) is the dangerous error: the coverage reaches only the sub's work, is capped by the sub's limits, and is subject to the sub's exclusions, so the prime's own exposures remain uninsured. (c) confuses being insured with owning the policy — the subcontractor buys it, controls it, and can let it lapse, which is why the prime asks for the endorsement and for notice of cancellation. (a) has nothing to do with the endorsement.

Suretyship involves three parties — principal, obligee, surety — and the surety guarantees the principal's obligation to the obligee, with a right of indemnity back against the principal. Insurance is a two-party transfer in which the insurer absorbs the insured's fortuitous loss and does not seek reimbursement. (b) describes insurance and labels it a bond, which is why contractors are surprised when a surety pursues them after paying a bond claim. (c) simply reverses the two definitions. (d) reverses who gets paid: the bond pays the obligee, and liability insurance defends and indemnifies the insured.

An indemnity or hold-harmless clause reallocates liability: the indemnitor promises to answer for, and usually to defend, specified claims that would otherwise fall on the indemnitee. It is a contractual device, normally backed by insurance, and it is bounded by Civil Code §2782, which voids indemnity for the promisee's own sole negligence or willful misconduct, and by §2782.05, which restricts a subcontractor's indemnity of a general contractor's active negligence. (a) describes a delay or liquidated damages clause. (b) inverts the usual pairing, since a promise to indemnify is only as good as the indemnitor's balance sheet, which is why insurance is required alongside it. (c) belongs to the lien law and cannot be achieved by an indemnity clause.

Civil Code §8416 requires the claimant to serve the owner with the lien and the statutory Notice of Mechanics Lien, and to record a proof of service affidavit with the lien; without it the lien is unenforceable. (a) is the most attractive wrong answer and fails on two counts — the preliminary notice is served rather than recorded, and it is not attached to the lien. (b) confuses proof of the debt with the recorded claim; the contract is evidence in the foreclosure action, not a recording requirement. (d) has no place in the lien statute at all.

Civil Code §8416 conditions enforceability on serving the owner or reputed owner with a copy of the lien and the statutory Notice of Mechanics Lien, and recording a proof of service affidavit with it. (a) borrows the §8460 deadline and shrinks it — the claimant has 90 days after recording to sue, not ten. (c) reverses who bonds: the 125 percent bond under §8424 is the owner's tool for clearing the lien from title, not a claimant's prerequisite. (d) would make the lien consensual, which defeats its purpose as a statutory security a claimant can assert without the owner's agreement.

Civil Code §8444(a) lets an owner of the property, or a person claiming an interest in it, that did not contract for the work of improvement give notice of nonresponsibility; it must be signed and verified, state the nature of the owner's title or interest, name any purchaser under contract or lessee known to the owner, and state that the person giving it is not responsible for claims arising from the work. §8444(e) is the trap: the notice is ineffective unless, within 10 days after the owner learns of the work, the owner BOTH posts it on the site and records it. (a) and (b) are claimants' instruments, not an owner's. (c) is the owner's completion filing, which shortens the deadlines in §8412 and §8414 but disclaims nothing.

Under Civil Code §8444, an owner must post the notice of non-responsibility in a conspicuous place on the property and record it within 10 days after first having knowledge of the work of improvement to disclaim responsibility for liens.

Civil Code §8180 defines completion to include actual completion, occupation/use plus cessation of labor, acceptance by the owner, or cessation of labor for 60 continuous days. Merely mailing a final invoice is not a statutory completion event.

Under Civil Code §8188, an owner may record a notice of cessation after labor has ceased for a continuous 30-day period. Recording it shortens the lien-recording deadlines for claimants (30 days for others, 60 for the direct contractor), similar to a notice of completion.

In a surety bond, the principal is the party whose obligation is guaranteed (e.g., the contractor). The obligee is the party protected (e.g., the owner or public agency), and the surety is the company issuing the bond and guaranteeing the principal's performance.

The obligee is the party for whose benefit the bond is written and who may make a claim if the principal fails to perform. On a public works performance bond, the public agency is the obligee; on a payment bond, unpaid subs and suppliers are protected.

Civil Code §8424 lets an owner, contractor, or anyone with an interest record a surety bond of 125 percent of the lien to free the title; the claimant's remedy then runs against the bond instead of the property. (b) points the wrong direction — a stop payment notice is a claimant's remedy that traps funds, not an owner's tool for clearing title. (c) is a real instrument with a real effect on deadlines under §8414, but it does nothing about a lien already recorded. (d) addresses work ordered by a tenant or other non-owner, and cannot remove a lien that has already attached.

Civil Code §8204(a) requires the preliminary notice to be given not later than 20 days after the claimant has first furnished work on the work of improvement, and a claimant who gives it later may claim only for work provided within the 20 days before service and afterwards. (d) is the most attractive wrong answer, since a subcontract is often signed weeks before anyone mobilizes and the statute counts furnishing rather than signing. (c) reverses the purpose of the notice, which is served before there is any payment problem. (a) confuses the two instruments: the notice comes first, and §8410 makes it a condition of enforcing the lien that is recorded later.

Additional insured status gives the upstream party defense and indemnity under the downstream party's policy for claims arising out of that party's work, and the certificate documents that the coverage was placed. (a) is the dangerous version of the idea: risk transfer supplements the general contractor's own coverage and never replaces it, and its own insurer will still be looking at the claim. (b) mixes insurance with lien priority, which is fixed by the mechanics lien statute and not by an endorsement. (c) crosses two lines of coverage — employee injuries are handled by each employer's workers' compensation policy, which additional insured status does not touch.

Labor Code §3706 lets an employee of an employer that failed to secure the payment of compensation bring an action at law for damages as if the workers' compensation division did not apply, and §3708 presumes the injury was a direct result of the employer's negligence, places the burden of rebutting that on the employer, and strips the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow servant. §3700.5 adds misdemeanor exposure. (a) invents a recovery fund California does not maintain for contractors, which is why the §7071.6 bond matters. (b) is the exclusive-remedy bargain the employer forfeits by going uninsured. (d) inverts the consequence of being uninsured.

B&P §7125.2 suspends the license automatically, by operation of law, effective on the earlier of the date the coverage lapsed or the date coverage was required to be obtained; work performed during the suspension is unlicensed work, with the §7031 collection bar and disgorgement exposure that follows. (d) borrows the 90 days from §7071.7, which lets the Registrar accept a BOND as of its effective date if it arrives within 90 days — there is no such grace period for insurance. (b) is the no-harm-no-foul belief, and the suspension does not wait for an injury. (c) is not a remedy anywhere in the chapter.

Having no direct contract with the owner, the supplier falls under Civil Code §8200 and must serve the owner or reputed owner, the direct contractor, and the construction lender if there is one. (a) is the error suppliers actually make — notifying the customer they invoiced, which preserves nothing. (b) stops one link short of the owner, and the owner is the party whose property is at risk. (d) is incomplete in the way that costs the most: without notice to the lender the supplier loses the bonded stop payment notice against undisbursed loan funds.

A performance bond runs to the obligee — usually the owner or the public entity — and guarantees performance of the contract; if the contractor defaults, the surety may complete the work itself, tender a replacement contractor, or pay damages up to the penal sum of the bond. (a) is the payment bond's job, and the two are usually bought together: on private work Civil Code §8608 fixes who may claim on it, and on public work §9550(a) requires one on any contract over $25,000. (b) is the lender's decision, which no surety guarantees. (c) is a separate statutory duty under B&P §7125 and Labor Code §3700.